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Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Putting the Legislative History in Proper
Perspective
Ugo Colella *
Adam Bain **

INTRODUCTION
Over one year ago, we suggested in the pages of this review that the
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Brockamp 1 and
United States v. Beggerly 2 cast doubt on the view among federal courts that
the limitations periods of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) could be
equitably tolled. 3 Equitable tolling extends a limitations period if a filing
deadline passes due to a defendant’s misconduct or a diligent plaintiff’s
failure to file a proper pleading in the correct forum. 4 Since the Supreme
Court decided Brockamp and Beggerly, courts have clung to the view that
equitable tolling is proper in FTCA cases. In doing so, some courts have
ignored Brockamp and Beggerly altogether.5 Other courts have
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1
519 U.S. 347 (1997).
2
524 U.S. 38 (1998).
3
See Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort
Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (1999);
see also Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations
Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 M IL. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that history
and purpose of FTCA’s statute of limitations precludes equitable tolling).
4
See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
5
See Barr v. United States, No. 98-7164 1999, WL 314634, at *1 (10th Cir. May 19,
1999) (table); Wartell v. United States, No. 96-16547, 1997 WL 59980, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept.
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distinguished the FTCA from the statutes at issue in those two cases,6 have
found unpersuasive certain portions of the legislative history,7 or have
found other reasons to permit equitable tolling. 8
In light of these recent developments, the Seton Hall Law Review has
been gracious enough to allow us to explain in greater depth whether the
FTCA’s legislative history sheds any light on the question of whether the
limitations periods in the Act may be equitably tolled, a point that perhaps
deserved further elaboration the first time around. Unfortunately, in our
1999 paper we relegated much of the legislative history to a footnote.9 We
simply pointed out that, prior to enacting the FTCA in 1946, Congress
considered legislative proposals that contained equitable tolling provisions,
but that when Congress finally enacted the FTCA, it declined to include
those provisions.10 To us, this pre-enactment history meant that the 1946
Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply, especially because the
Supreme Court endorsed this method of construing the intent behind the
FTCA.11 We also examined the legislative history accompanying the 1949
and 1966 changes to the Act’s statute of limitations and argued that this
history, combined with the pre-enactment history, indicated a congressional
intent to preclude equitable tolling. 12
19, 1997) (table); Hudson v. United States Postal Serv., Nos. C 99-5117 WHA, C 00-0093
WHA, 2000 WL 23678, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000); St. John v. United States, 54 F.
Supp. 2d 1322, 1326-27 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Yillah v. United States, No. Civ.A. 98-2842, 1998
WL 661545, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998); Berlin v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653
(S.D. W.Va. 1997); Magdalenski v. United States, 977 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. Mass 1997);
Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 543, 553 (W.D. Mo. 1997);
Hyatt v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
6
See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that two-year
period may be equitably tolled because FTCA not as complex as statute in Brockamp);
Forman v. United States, No. Civ. A. 98-6784, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6,
1999) (holding that six-month limitations period may be equitably tolled because, among
other reasons, the Brockamp Court “said that the more complex the limitations period, the
less likely equitable tolling is permissible”).
7
See Stanfill v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding
that six-month period may be equitably tolled because legislative history provided “scant”
evidence of an intent to preclude equitable tolling); Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *8 & n.11
(stating that neither Beggerly nor Brockamp considered legislative history in reaching their
conclusions); see also Perez, 167 F.3d at 916 (holding that two-year period may be
equitably tolled because legislative-history evidence to the contrary was, among other
things, “equivocal”).
8
See Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *8-*10 (holding that six-month limitations period
may be equitably tolled because there is no built-in tolling, the period is “short,” the “nature
of tort law suggests that equitable considerations are proper under the FTCA,” and applying
equitable tolling would not present administrative problems).
9
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 907-08 n.111.
10
See id.
11
See id. at 907 & n.109.
12
See id. at 905-14.
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Courts have not been swayed by the FTCA’s legislative history,
perhaps because they think it is irrelevant or perhaps because they think it
is inconclusive.13 These results are not altogether surprising given certain
normative and practical considerations that arise when legislative history is
presented as a basis for construing a statute. From a normative perspective,
resort to legislative history can be a touchy subject with Article III courts.
Judges who have textualist leanings would much rather draw their
conclusions about congressional intent from the plain terms of the statute
under review. On the other hand, there are judges who have intentionalist
leanings who do not become as queasy as textualists when presented with
arguments based on legislative historyalthough intentionalists do insist
that the legislative evidence rise to a threshold level of reliability. 14 From a
practical perspective, legislative history is not as accessible to courts and
litigants as are other sources for decision, is often much harder to navigate,
and requires courts and litigants to absorb and analyze a great deal of
information. 15 Add to this the fact that the FTCA’s legislative history, as it
pertains to whether equitable tolling was contemplated for the Act’s statute
of limitations, has never been fleshed out in any great detail.
In this Article, we defend the use of legislative history in construing
the FTCA, not because it is “correct” in the normative sense, but because
long-standing precedent and the unique history of the Act require courts to
look to the Act’s legislative history to ascertain congressional intent. In
Part I, we restate the problem that we addressed in our 1999 paper, pointing
out that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Beggerly and Brockamp
require courts to re-examine the question of whether equitable tolling is
proper in FTCA cases. In Part II, we present the answers that a few courts
have given to the Beggerly-Brockamp question. We pay particular
attention to those courts’ analyses of the FTCA’s legislative history in
reaching the conclusion that equitable tolling is proper in FTCA cases.
In Part III, we shift gears a bit and briefly visit the academic debate
surrounding the use of legislative history in statutory construction. The
13

See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that evidence
from legislative history is “equivocal”); Stanfill v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308
(M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that legislative history provided “scant” evidence to rebut the
presumption favoring equitable tolling); Forman v. United States, No. Civ. A. 98-6784,
1999 WL 793429, at *8 & n.11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1999) (holding that legislative history was
irrelevant).
14
See infra Part III, for a more extended discussion of this issue.
15
Justice Scalia has said that resort to legislative history is “a waste of research time
and ink” and “condemns litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets)
to subsidizing historical research by lawyers.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). As we shall see, however, Justice Scalia has not been so
unforgiving when it comes to the equitable tolling question or when it comes to interpreting
the intent behind the FTCA. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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academic commentary has opened up a number of schools of thought that
purportedly shed light on the question of whether legislative history should
be used in statutory construction. We conclude, however, that as a
practical matter, there are only two approaches to the legislative history
problem: Judges either rely upon legislative history (the intentionalists) or
they do not (the textualists). We then examine the intentionalist and
textualist methodologies at work in sovereign immunity cases, with a
particular emphasis on equitable tolling and FTCA cases. We conclude
that the Supreme Court has adopted an intentionalist approach to determine
whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply in cases against the
federal government and that the Court has consistently looked to the
FTCA’s legislative history for evidence of congressional intent.
In Part IV, we present the legislative history accompanying the
FTCA’s statute of limitations and show that Congress, having crafted a
precise and unambiguous limitations regime in the Act, has assumed the
task of remedying any inequities produced by the Act’s limitations periods.
In Part V, we critically examine the few cases that have addressed, or more
accurately, have failed to address, the FTCA’s legislative history in
determining whether the Act’s limitations periods may be equitably tolled
in circumstances not specifically covered by the language of the statute.
We compare the reasoning in those cases to the legislative history
accompanying the changes to the Act’s statute of limitations and conclude
that the few decisions that have attempted to apply the reasoning of
Beggerly and Brockamp to the FTCA should not be followed. Rather,
Congress’s historical involvement in changing the Act’s statute of
limitations to account for inequitable circumstances, read in conjunction
with other indicators of congressional intent detailed in our 1999 paper,16
suggests that the FTCA’s limitations periods may not be equitably tolled.
Finally, in Part VI, we comment on what the future may hold and offer
some thoughts on the broader context within which the equitable tolling
question must be answered.

16

See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 905-14 (arguing that built-in tolling of the twoyear period and purposes underlying the two-year and six-month limitations period, in
addition to legislative history, compel the conclusion that equitable tolling is impermissible
in FTCA cases).
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THE P ROBLEM RESTATED

We start with the basics. The FTCA is a limited waiver of the United
States’ historical immunity from tort liability.
It must be strictly
construed. 17 The Act’s statute of limitations provides the following:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years
after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months
after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of
18
final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.

Thus, the FTCA contains two time limitations with which claimants
must comply. The first requires a claimant to file an administrative tort
claim with the appropriate federal agency within two years from the time
the claim accrues.19 The second requires a claimant to file suit in federal
district court within six months after the agency denies, in writing, the
administrative claim.20 The Supreme Court and lower courts have held that
the Act’s limitations periods are conditions on Congress’s waiver of the
United States’ immunity from tort suits, and they are designed to facilitate
the prompt presentation of tort claims against the United States.21
The FTCA’s statute of limitations, however, has been changed since
1946, the year the Act was passed. The original statute required a claimant
to file suit in federal district court within one year after the claim accrued,
and there was no mandatory requirement that a claimant submit a tort claim
to a federal agency before filing suit.22 However, if a claim was submitted
to an agency within one year of accrual, the claimant had six months after
the claim was denied or withdrawn by the claimant to file suit in federal
court.23 In 1949, the one-year limitations period was extended to two

17
See United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. United States, 105 F.3d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1997);
Hayes v. United States ex rel. United States Dep’t of the Army, 44 F.3d 377, 378 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 814 (1995); Nelson v. United States, 838 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
18
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); Johnson v. Smithsonian
Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999); Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Cir.
1998); Hart v. Dep’t of Labor ex rel. United States, 116 F.3d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir. 1991)); Arigo v.
United States, 980 F.2d 1159, 1160 (8th Cir. 1992); Gould v. United States Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025
(1991); Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1231 (1984).
22
See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 40
U.S.C. §§ 2, 33 & 40 (1986)).
23
See id.
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years, and the six-month limitations period applicable to agency denials
and claimant withdrawals remained the same.24 In 1966, the statute of
limitations was changed again to correspond with the administrativepresentment requirement that Congress added to the Act.25 Under the 1966
changes, an FTCA claimant had two years after a tort claim accrued to
submit that claim to the appropriate federal agency for possible
settlement.26 The administrative-presentment requirementwhich, until
1966, had not been mandatorynow became a permanent procedural
requirement for bringing tort claims against the United States. To comport
with this new requirement, Congress provided tort claimants an additional
six months within which to file suit in federal court after the claim was
denied by the agency. 27 In 1988, Congress created limited exceptions to
the Act’s statute of limitations in circumstances where the United States is
substituted as the proper party-defendant in cases involving federal
employees who were named as improper parties for common law tortious
acts or omissions arising from the course and scope of their employment.28
Prior to 1990, courts almost uniformly held that the Act’s two-year
and six-month limitations periods could not be equitably tolled. 29 That
changed in 1990, with the Supreme Court’s holding in Irwin v. Department
of Veterans Affairs.30 In Irwin, the Court held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that limitations periods in waiver-of-sovereign-immunity
statutes may be equitably tolled. 31 Irwin involved Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which imposed a thirty-day limitation period on cases
brought against private parties and the United States. Finding no
congressional indication to the contrary, the Court concluded that because
equitable tolling is available in suits against private party defendants, it
would be incongruous to conclude that equitable tolling would be
unavailable in suits against the United States.32
24

See H.R. REP . NO . 81-276, at 3 (1949) [hereinafter H.R. REP . NO . 276]; S. REP . NO .
81-135, at 4 (1949) [hereinafter S. REP . NO . 135]; H.R. REP . NO . 80-1754, at 4 (1948)
[hereinafter H.R. REP . NO . 1754].
25
See, e.g., H.R. REP . NO . 89-1532, at 6-7 (1966) [hereinafter H.R. REP . NO . 1532]; S.
REP . NO . 89-1327, at 2-3 (1966) [hereinafter S. REP . NO . 1327].
26
See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
27
See id. In addition, the claimant could file suit at any time after allowing the agency
six months to consider the claim, provided that the agency had not granted or denied the
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994).
28
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(d)(5)(A)-(B) (1994). In our 1999 paper, we did not include
the equitable tolling provisions of § 2679 in our analysis.
29
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 887-88 & n.12 (cases cited therein).
30
498 U.S. 89 (1990).
31
See id. at 95-96.
32
See id. at 95. Indeed, Irwin should be read together with the Court’s earlier decision
in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-99 (1982), which examined the
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As we pointed out in our earlier paper, despite Irwin’s clear
rebuttable-presumption rule, lower courts reflexively (and incorrectly)
relied on the case as authority for the proposition that equitable tolling is
available against the United States, without engaging in an analysis of
whether the presumption favoring tolling had been rebutted. 33 In many
instances, courts citing Irwin reflexively found that equitable tolling was
available against the United States in FTCA actions.34 However, in United
States v. Brockamp 35 and United States v. Beggerly 36 the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that Irwin meant that equitable tolling is always
available against the United States. In those cases, the Supreme Court
made more explicit what should have been clear from Irwin, namely courts
are required to look at congressional intentas evinced in text, purpose,
and legislative historyto determine whether the presumption in favor of
equitable tolling has been rebutted. 37 In particular, the Brockamp Court
articulated the Irwin test as follows: The rebuttable presumption may be
overcome if there is “good reason to believe that Congress did not want the
equitable tolling doctrine to apply” in a particular category of cases.38
Accordingly, after Brockamp and Beggerly, courts are required to answer
the following question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did
not intend equitable tolling to apply to FTCA cases?
II. THE CURRENT ANSWER TO THE BEGGERLY-BROCKAMP QUESTION
In the FTCA context, few courts have addressed the issue since
Beggerly and Brockamp. Those that have engaged in the required analysis
found that Irwin’s rebuttable presumption had not been overcome and have
concluded that the Act’s limitations periods can be equitably tolled. 39
Since Beggerly and Brockamp, however, some courts have not followed
those decisions and have, instead, relied upon previous cases that cite Irwin
as the basis for concluding that the Act’s limitations periods may be
equitably tolled. 40 The few cases that have specifically addressed Beggerly
and Brockamp require closer examination.
statute of limitations provisions of Title VII (including the legislative history) and concluded
that Congress intended equitable tolling to apply. See id. at 392-98.
33
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 887-88 (describing the pre-Irwin cases, which
held that equitable tolling was unavailable under the FTCA, and the post-Irwin cases that
held that equitable tolling was available).
34
See id. at 888 n.13 (cases cited therein).
35
519 U.S. 347 (1997).
36
524 U.S. 38 (1998).
37
See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48-49; Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 349-54.
38
Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350.
39
See supra notes 6-8 (authorities cited therein).
40
See supra note 5 (authorities cited therein).
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In Perez v. United States,41 the Fifth Circuit held that the FTCA’s
two-year limitations period may be equitably tolled. The court rejected
suggestions in the legislative history that the FTCA should not be equitably
tolled, reasoning that the arguments were “equivocal at best.”42 In reaching
that conclusion, the Perez court concluded that “deductions from
congressional inaction are notoriously unreliable.”43 The court also
commented that “[p]erhaps these pieces of evidence are the best that can be
collected from a legislative record that does not directly address the issue,
but they are insufficient to overcome the presumption of Irwin that the
government is subject to equitable tolling.”44 The district court’s decision
in Stanfill v. United States45 proceeded along similar lines. There, the court
concluded that the six-month limitations period is subject to equitable
tolling.46 Relying largely on Perez, the court held that the evidence from
the FTCA’s legislative history was “scant” and “insufficient to rebut the
presumption that equitable tolling should apply to the six-month limitations
period . . . .”47 Finally, the district court in Forman v. United States48
disregarded the legislative history altogether, concluding that neither
Beggerly nor Brockamp considered legislative history in their equitable
tolling determinations.49

41

167 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 916 (citing Parker & Colella, supra note 3).
43
Id. at 916-17 (citing Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 803 n.3 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting)).
44
Id. at 917. In addition to rejecting the legislative history, the Perez court also
anchored its conclusion to the alleged non-jurisdictional nature of the FTCA’s limitations
periods. According to the court, “whether the limitations provisions of the FTCA are
jurisdictional in which case equitable tolling could not applyremains an open question
in this circuit.” Id. at 915 (emphasis added). On this point, Perez is on shakier ground, for
at least one court has already disagreed with Perez’s conclusion on the jurisdictional issue.
See Heinrich v. Sweet, 44 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 n.6 (D. Mass. 1999). Most importantly,
however, Perez is flatly inconsistent with other, post-Irwin Fifth Circuit decisions, in which
the court has held that the Act’s limitation periods are jurisdictional. See Flory v. United
States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998) (“It is well-settled that these limitation periods are
jurisdictional.” (emphasis added)); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 218 n.2 (5th Cir.
1996) (“FTCA time limitations are jurisdictional.”); MacMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d
377, 380 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The failure to timely file an administrative claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act is a jurisdictional defect.”).
45
43 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
46
See id. at 1308.
47
Id. at 1308 (citing Parker & Colella, supra note 3).
48
No. Civ. A. 98-6784, 1999 WL 793429 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1999).
49
See id. at *8 n.11 (citing Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 905-15).
42
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III. WHY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATTERS:
CRASHING THE COCKTAIL P ARTY
The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation has fallen into
disrepute in recent years. Its use has been described as “the equivalent of
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests
for one’s friends.”50 It may be amusing to think of legislative history as a
“cocktail party,” and its interpretation as merely a search for one’s
“friends.” The real question, however, if we may carry the metaphor, is
whether to attend the cocktail party at all, and, if so, whether there is
something to be learned from getting to know everyone there.
In our 1999 paper, we assumed that all indicators of congressional
intentstatutory text and legislative historywere relevant to and
probative of the question of whether the FTCA’s limitations periods may
be equitably tolled. Because we now wish to elaborate on the part of our
earlier position that emphasized legislative history, we need to address a
threshold issue: Why should legislative history be considered at all when
courts answer the Beggerly-Brockamp question?
Of course, for trial attorneys the short answer is that the case law
expressly endorses such an approach, a point we shall elaborate upon in a
moment. But first, we must look at the theoretical underpinnings of the
approach we advocate here and consult the legal commentary on the
subject. There is plenty of it. Over the years, numerous commentators
have written about the propriety of relying on legislative history as a guide
to statutory interpretation. 51 What emerges are many schools of thought:
50

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (attributing this
statement to Judge Harold Leventhal).
51
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 3 (1997); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999);
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL . L.
REV. 845 (1992); Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices
Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80
M ARQ . L. REV. 161 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?,
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court
Read The Federalist but not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1301
(1998); Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1247 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994);
Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction?, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL ’Y 43 (1988); William S. Jordan III, Legislative History and Statutory
Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1994); Michael H.
Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of
Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading
Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in
Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History
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the textualists; the new textualists; the intentionalists (including the simple
intentionalists and the imaginative reconstructionists); the purposivists; the
common law originalists; and the public justificationists.52
We shall not add another “ist” to this already over-crowded list of
statutory constructionists. As we have commented before in a different
context,53 the academic commentary does more to obscure matters than to
provide real insight into judicial decision-making, much less prescribe
practical, clearly-defined paths for how judges decide cases. Indeed, the
commentary does not provide useful rules for those who actually will have
to litigate and decide the equitable tolling question. Contrary to the view
among academics, our view is simple. Judges take one of two approaches
to the problem posed by legislative history: either they look only at the text
of the statute (the textualists) or they go beyond the text to arrive at
congressional intent (the intentionalists). The benefits and drawbacks of
relying on legislative history in statutory interpretation have been
summarized quite well by Judge Kozinski,54 and we see no need to repeat
them here. Suffice it to say that the textualists disregard legislative history
largely because they think it is illegitimate and unreliable, and
intentionalists embrace legislative history mainly because they see it as a
useful guide for understanding (but not replacing) the meaning of statutory
language.55
Let us now take a closer look at how textualists and intentionalists
derive meaning from a waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute.
The
Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998); Jack Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn,
The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54
M D . L. REV. 432 (1995); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998);
Stephen F. Williams, Restoring Context, Distorting Text: Legislative History and the
Problem of Age, 66 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1366 (1998); Jesse M. Barrett, Note, Legislative
History, the Neutral, Dispassionate Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the
Latter Ideals Through the Former Tool, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819 (1998); Edward
Heath, Note, How Federal Judges Use Legislative History, 25 J. LEGIS. 95 (1999); Note,
Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1005 (1992).
52
See Bell, supra note 51 (identifying the public justificationist and describing the
simple intentionalist); Breyer, supra note 51 (identifying the intentionalist); Easterbrook,
supra note 51 (the textualist); Hart & Saks, supra note 51 (identifying the purposivists);
Posner, supra note 51, at 817-22 (identifying the imaginative reconstructionist); SCALIA,
supra note 51 (identifying the new textualist); Schacter, supra note 51 (identifying the
common law originalist).
53
See Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859,
2885-86 (1999) (criticizing the numerous theoretical formulas for the burden of proof
concept because most practitioners know what the concept means).
54
See Kozinski, supra note 51, at 812-14.
55
See id.
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textualist school, whose most notable spokesperson is Justice Scalia, sees
legislative history as the “last hope of lost interpretive causes, th[e] St. Jude
of the hagiology of statutory construction . . . .”56 In the waiver-ofsovereign-immunity context, Justice Scalia generally follows the textualist
methodology. In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,57 Justice Scalia,
writing for a seven-to-two majority, reasoned that “[w]aivers of the
Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be unequivocally
expressed[,] . . . strictly construed in favor of the sovereign, and not
enlarged . . . beyond what the language requires . . . .”58 According to
Justice Scalia, an unambiguous statute cannot be made ambiguous by
resorting to legislative history. The Justice further noted that “[i]f clarity
does not exist, it cannot be supplied by a committee report.”59
By contrast, the intentionalist takes a different view of the importance
of legislative history in construing waiver statutes. The intentionalist,
whose most notable spokesperson is Justice Breyer, not only looks to the
language of a statute, but also examines other reliable and relevant sources
of congressional intent, including legislative history, when interpreting a
particular statute. Intentionalists do not seek to understand the subjective
motivations of Congress, but rather to define congressional “intent” as the
objective purpose behind legislation. 60 For the intentionalist, legislative
history is not always relevant or reliable. Yet, the intentionalist will use
legislative history in statutory interpretation when that history aids judges
in crafting a workable, consistent, and understandable body of statutory
law.61

56

United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
57
503 U.S. 30 (1992).
58
Id. at 33, 34 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
59
Id. at 37; accord Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A statute’s legislative
history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text . . . .”).
60
See Breyer, supra note 51, at 864 (“Conceptually . . . one can ascribe an ‘intent’ to
Congress in enacting the words of a statute if one means ‘intent’ in its . . . sense of
‘purpose’, rather than its sense of ‘motive.’”).
61
Id. at 862 (“‘If the history is vague, or seriously conflicting, do not use it.’ No one
claims that history is always useful; only that it sometimes helps.”). The author continues:
[O]ne should recall that legislative history is a judicial tool, one judges use to
resolve difficult problems of judicial interpretation. It can be justified . . . by
its ability to help judges interpret statutes, in a manner that makes sense and
that will produce a workable set of laws . . . . [C]ourts might use it as part of
their overarching interpretive task of producing a coherent and relatively
consistent body of statutory law . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 867 See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48:03 (6th ed., rev. 2000) (“It is established practice in American legal
processes to consider relevant information concerning the historical background of
enactments in making decisions about how a statute is to be constructed and applied.”).
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Whether textualism or intentionalism is the “correct” method of
statutory construction in the normative sense surely is not a matter that we
address here; that debate is best left to the law professors, who have much
to say on the subject. Rather, we are more concerned with the practical,
real-world problem of understanding how the Supreme Court and lower
courts (who take their cues from the Court) will approach the question of
whether equitable tolling is available in FTCA cases. Unfortunately, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to get a firm grip on the Supreme Court’s
approach to interpreting waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes. The
Court’s recent decision in West v. Gibson62 demonstrates why.
In West, the Court had to decide whether, pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) had the authority to award compensatory damages against the
United States. In a closely divided five-to-four decision, Justice Breyer
(joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg) looked to
“[t]he language, purpose, and history of the 1972 Title VII extension and
the 1991 [Compensatory Damages Amendment]” to reach the conclusion
that “Congress has authorized the EEOC to award compensatory damages
in Federal Government employment discrimination cases.”63 Included in
Justice Breyer’s analysis was a review of legislative history and the
changes made to Title VII in 1972 and 1991. 64
In dissent, Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas) reasoned that, because the text of Title VII did
not waive the United States’ immunity from an EEOC award of
compensatory damages, Congress did not waive the United States’
immunity in the manner suggested by the majority. 65 The dissenters
disagreed with the majority’s resort to legislative history, reasoning that “it
contradicts our precedents and sets us on a new course, for before today it
was well settled that ‘[a] statute’s legislative history cannot supply a waiver
that does not appear clearly in any statutory text.’”66
The Court’s decision in West is one example of how the individual
Justices interpret waiver statutes. Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer have endorsed intentionalism through an analysis of
Title VII’s legislative history, whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas endorsed textualism by eschewing a
legislative history analysis.

62
63
64
65
66

527 U.S. 212 (1999).
Id. at 217.
See id. at 219-21.
See id. at 224-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Lane, 518 U.S. at 192).
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The Court’s decision in Lane v. Pena67 provides a different
understanding. In Lane, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburgwho,
as part of the majority, sanctioned the use of legislative history in
Westtook a page out of the textualist book and insisted that a waiver of
the federal government’s immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text” and that legislative history cannot supply a waiver of
immunity where none exists in the text of the statute.68
Whatever may be the fate of textualist or intentionalist approaches to
construing congressional waivers of sovereign immunity in the run of
cases, we have seen these two methodologies at work in the equitable
tolling context. Fortunately, the Court appears to have settled on one
approachintentionalism. But, it has not always been that way. In
Soriano v. United States,69 the Supreme Court initially endorsed a textualist
approach to decide whether equitable tolling is available in suits against the
federal government. The Court in Soriano held that when Congress sets a
limitations period in the text of a waiver statute, it “mean[s] just that period
and no more.”70 Thus, Soriano, like Justice Scalia’s textualist opinion in
Nordic Village, answers the equitable tolling question this way: If equitable
tolling is not found in the text of the waiver statute, courts must conclude
that equitable tolling does not come within the congressional waiver of
sovereign immunity.
However, Soriano’s textualist approach appears to have been
displaced by Irwin, Brockamp, and Beggerly, which plainly prescribe an
intentionalist framework for resolving the question of whether equitable
tolling is permissible in a statute that waives the United States’ sovereign
immunity. The rebuttable -presumption rule prescribed by the Irwin Court
necessarily requires courts to look beyond the text of a statute to determine
whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply. Irwin instructs that if
the text of a statute of limitations within a waiver statute does not include
equitable tolling, that fact alone does not compel the conclusion that
equitable tolling is impermissible. According to Irwin, a difference in
language (i.e., statutory text) is not enough to “manifest a different
congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling.”71
Moreover, the rebuttable -presumption rule itself endorses an intentionalist
approach. “[A]ll presumptions used in interpreting statutes,” the Supreme
Court has said, “may be overcome by specific language or specific
67

518 U.S. 187 (1996).
Id. at 192 (relying on Justice Scalia’s opinion in United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)).
69
352 U.S. 270 (1957).
70
Id. at 276.
71
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990).
68
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legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent. . . .
The congressional intent necessary to overcome the presumption may . . .
be inferred . . . from the collective import of legislative and judicial history
behind a particular statute.”72 In Brockamp and Beggerly, we see the
intentionalist methodology at work. In those cases, the Court looked to the
language of the waiver statutes, their purpose, their legislative history, or
some combination of the three to reach the conclusion that equitable tolling
was impermissible.73
Indeed, not even Justice Scalia has insisted upon a textualist approach
to resolve the equitable tolling problem, or, for that matter, other statutory
construction problems that arise in the FTCA context. Justice Scalia’s
agreement with the Irwin majority is particularly interesting. Justice White
(joined by Justice Marshall, who can hardly be dubbed a textualist) issued a
concurring opinion in which he carried the textualist banner. Justice White
reasoned that the Court should have held, consistent with Soriano, that
equitable tolling was impermissible because the text of Title VII did not
provide for it.74 Rather than follow the textualist approach suggested by
Justice White, Justice Scalia instead joined the Irwin majority, which laid
down a rebuttable -presumption rule of statutory construction. 75
In
Brockamp, the Court examined legislative history in reaching its
conclusion that equitable tolling was impermissible,76 and in Beggerly, the
Court looked to the text of, and the purposes behind, the Quiet Title Act in
reaching its conclusion that equitable tolling was inconsistent with
congressional intent.77 In each of these cases, which surely do not qualify
for entry into the textualist hall of fame, Justice Scalia joined majority

72

Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
73
See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1998) (looking to the language
and purpose behind the Quiet Title Act and concluding that equitable tolling is inconsistent
with both); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1997) (looking to language,
purpose, and legislative history of tax-refund statute and concluding that equitable tolling is
inconsistent with congressional intent); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95 (looking to the fact that Title
VII suits brought against private defendants subject to equitable tolling, such that same
claims against the United States should also be subject to equitable tolling).
74
See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring) (“It seems to me that the Court in
this case, by holding that the [30-day] time limit in [Title VII’s statute of limitations] is
subject to equitable tolling, . . . has enlarged the waiver in [the statute of limitations] beyond
what the language of that section requires.”).
75
Since Irwin, Justice Scalia has expressed his disapproval of the use of presumptions
in statutory interpretation, referring to them as “dice-loading rules” that cause “a lot of
trouble.” See SCALIA, supra note 51, at 28.
76
See Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352 (relying on House Conference Report).
77
See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 49 (“Equitable tolling of the already generous statute of
limitations incorporated in the QTA would throw a cloud of uncertainty over these rights,
and we hold that it is incompatible with the Act.”).
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opinions that endorsed an intentionalist approach to statutory construction.
In addition, beyond the equitable tolling issue, Justice Scalia has often
joined majority and dissenting opinions in FTCA cases that rely upon the
Act’s legislative history. 78
Accordingly, although the text of waiver-of-sovereign-immunity
statutes has factored into an examination of congressional intent, Justice
Scalia (perhaps uncharacteristically) has not insisted that text, and text
alone, remains determinative in every case. That brings the intentionalist
approach to interpreting waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes squarely in
line with FTCA precedent. Largely because the FTCA enjoys a rich
historical pedigree, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1946 was the product of some twenty-eight years of
congressional
drafting
and
redrafting,
amendment
and
counter-amendment.”79 Because of this rich pedigree, the Supreme Court
has consulted the Act’s legislative history for genuine indications of
congressional intent. In particular, the Court has consistently relied upon
the FTCA’s pre-enactment legislative history to determine what Congress
intended in various provisions of the Act.80 In addition to the pre78
See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 202-03 n.4 (1993) (Justice Scalia joining
majority opinion, which relied on pre-enactment legislative history for interpreting meaning
of language in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994)); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 n.7
(1993) (unanimous decision relying on legislative history accompanying the 1966 changes
to the FTCA); United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 n.9 (1991) (Justice Scalia joining
majority opinion, which relied on legislative history accompanying the 1988 changes to the
FTCA); Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 410-11 (1988) (O’Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on pre-enactment legislative history for
guidance in interpreting assault and battery exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)); Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538-39 n.4 (1988) (unanimous decision relying on preenactment legislative history for guidance in interpreting the discretionary function
exception).
79
United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1949); see also Molzof v. United
States, 502 U.S. 301, 308 (1992) (reporting that Congress spent twenty-eight years drafting
and redrafting the FTCA); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 707 (1961) (same). See
generally David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 291-94
(1988) (analyzing the historical background of the discretionary function exception).
80
See Smith, 507 U.S. at 202-03 n.4 (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)); Berkovitz, 486
U.S. at 538-39 n.4 (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52,
55, 59 (1985) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)); United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808-09 & n.8 (1984) (consulting 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a)); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 858 n.17 (1984) (consulting 28
U.S.C. § 2680(c)); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 463-64 & n.4
(1980) (same); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 531 (1973) (consulting 28 U.S.C. §
2671 (1994)); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)
(1993)); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153-58 (1963) (deciding whether prisoners
could state claims under FTCA); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 8-10, 14 & nn.1517, 20, 29 (1962) (consulting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674); United States v. Gilman, 347
U.S. 507, 511-12 n.2 (1954) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994)); Dalehite v. United
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enactment history, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have relied
upon the legislative history accompanying the 1949, 1966, and 1988
changes to the FTCA’s statute of limitations.81 Thus, the FTCA’s
legislative history is not only relevant, but critical to determine what
Congress intended when it enacted and later modified the Act’s statute of
limitations.
Returning to the metaphor we introduced at the beginning of this
section, Beggerly, Brockamp, Irwin, and well-settled precedent extend an
invitation to the cocktail party. Lower courts should accept the invitation.

States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 n.11, 28 nn.17, 20, 45 (1953) (consulting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1),
2680(a)); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-50 & n.8 (1951) (deciding
whether the United States can be sued for tort contribution); Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220-21
nn.6-10 (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51-52 nn.24 (1949) (deciding whether members of the armed forces could recover under FTCA).
Although he has joined FTCA decisions in which the Act’s pre-enactment legislative
history has been relied upon for ascertaining congressional intent, Justice Scalia has given a
tongue-lashing to the use of failed legislative proposals in the interpretive process. See
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join
the opinion of the Court except that portion which takes seriously, and thus encourages in
the future, an argument that should be laughed out of court” [i.e., that Congress’s failure to
enact a proposal has meaning]); id. (“Congress can not express its will by a failure to
legislate. The act of refusing to enact a law (if that can be called an act) has utterly no legal
effect, and thus has utterly no place in a serious discussion of the law.”); id. at 536 (“[T]he
Court’s fascination with the files of Congress (we must consult them, because they are
there) is carried to a new silly extreme. Today’s opinion ever-so-carefully analyzes, not
legislative history, but the history of legislation-that-never-was.”); id. at 536-37 (“If we take
this sort of material seriously, we require conscientious counsel to investigate (at clients’
expense) not only the hearings, committee reports, and floor debates pertaining to the
history of the law at issue (which is bad enough), but to find, and then investigate the
hearings, committee reports, and floor debates pertaining to, later bills on the same subject
that were never enacted. This is beyond all reason, and we should say so.”).
81
See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995) (relying on H.R.
REP . NO . 100-700 and 1988 changes to Act); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112
nn.7, 8 (1993) (relying on legislative history accompanying the 1966 changes to the Act);
United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 n.9 (1991) (relying on H.R. REP . NO . 100-700
and 1988 changes to Act); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120-21 n.6 (1979)
(relying on H.R. REP . NO . 276 regarding the 1949 changes to the Act’s statute of
limitations); Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1997) (relying on H.R.
REP . NO . 100-700 and 1988 changes to Act); Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610-11
(9th Cir. 1982) (relying on S. REP . NO . 1327 regarding the 1966 changes to the Act); Tucker
v. United States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Odin v. United
States, 656 F.2d 798, 801-02 nn.11, 17, 804-05 nn.25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same); Lunsford
v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1977) (relying on H.R. REP . NO . 1532
regarding the 1966 changes to the Act); Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88, 90
(3d Cir. 1972) (relying on H.R. REP . NO . 276 regarding the 1949 changes to the Act’s
statute of limitations).
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ACCOMPANYING THE FTCA’S STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Let us now return to the FTCA and place the equitable tolling
question in the proper historical context, for that history provides valuable
insights into whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply to the
Act’s limitations periods. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United
States was immune from tort liability under the historical doctrine of
sovereign immunity.82 Not all tort compensation was precluded, but
sovereign immunity prevented individuals from seeking tort compensation
in Article III courts. In the early 1900s, persons who suffered from tortious
conduct committed by a government employee could seek compensation
through a private bill of relief from Congress.83 The private bill consisted
of a legislative proposal presented in Congress that would either provide
tort compensation to an individual or provide the injured party with a
jurisdictional ticket to adjudicate a particular claim. 84 Although there were
statutes on the books waiving the United States’ immunity for certain
claims,85 there was no statute that generally waived the United States’
immunity from tort liability. Some time passed before Congress finally
enacted a tort statute applic able to the United States. During that time
period, Congress actively tried to shape the contours of what would later
become the FTCA.
A. The Pre-Enactment Legislative History
The federal tort claims legislation that made its way through various
Congresses prior to the 1946 enactment of the FTCA reveals that equitable
tolling provisions were proposed at various times and in various forms.86
Between 1925 and 1931, bills that were introduced in the House and Senate
contained a wide range of time limitations applicable to tort actions brought
against the United States. Three of the bills did not even include a waiver
of sovereign immunity for property damage claims.87 In each of the
proposals that waived immunity for all tort claims, the limitations period
for property damage claims was different from the periods prescribed for
82

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal
Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 311, 314, 321-22 (1942).
84
See id. at 322; Roscoe Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 37 T UL . L.
REV. 685, 689 (1963).
85
See Holtzoff, supra note 83, at 314-20 (describing the few waiver-of-sovereignimmunity statutes).
86
See infra p. 220 (table attached as an appendix to this paper presenting the various
statute of limitations proposals that were considered by Congress prior to 1946).
87
See generally H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong. (1925); H.R.
12178, 68th Cong. (1925).
83
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personal injury and death claims.88 The 1926 House and Senate bills
extended the limitations periods for personal injury and death claims (but
not property damage claims) by six months fi “reasonable cause” was
shown. 89 The 1926 bills provided that the limitations periods on all tort
claims did not begin to run for persons under eighteen or for those who are
“mentally incompetent” so long as “such individual[s are] without a
guardian, trustee, or committee.”90
In 1928 and 1930, the House and Senate again considered bills that
prescribed different limitations periods for property damage, personal
injury, and death claims.91 The limitations periods prescribed in the 1928
and 1930 bills were different from the limitations provisions of the 1926
bills.92 In addition, the 1928 and 1930 bills retained equitable tolling in
personal injury and death cases for “reasonable cause shown,” and
extended the tolling period from six months to one year.93 All limitations
periods were subject to tolling in cases involving persons under the age of
twenty-one, “idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the
sea.”94 In 1931, however, the bills that were introduced in Congress did not
include the “reasonable cause” provision,95 and only one of the bills
contained a tolling provision for minors under twenty-one, “idiots, lunatics,
insane persons, and persons [at] sea.”96
In 1932, a Senate bill reinstated the “reasonable cause” provision. 97
88

See S. 211, 72d Cong. (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1931); H.R.
17168, 71st Cong. §§ 2, 202 (1931); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 22 (1931); H.R. 15428,
71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(d) (1930); H.R. 9285,
70th Cong. §§ 1(b), 202(a) (1928); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 1(b), 202(a) (1926); H.R. 8914,
69 Cong. § 5 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 6 (1925).
89
See S. 1912, 69th Cong. § 202(a) (1926); H.R. 6716. 69th Cong. § 202(c) (1926). But
see H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926) (not providing for any equitable tolling).
90
S. 1912, 69th Cong. § 304 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. § 305 (1926); see also H.R.
REP . NO . 69-667, at 7 § 305 (1926) (Committee report on S. 1912, stating that “the rights of
minors and mental incompetents who are without a guardian, trustee, or committee at the
time their claims accrue are protected, by providing that the [s]tatutes of limitation in the
bill are tolled until the appointment of a representative to take advantage of their rights.”
(emphasis added)). But see H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926) (not providing for any equitable
tolling).
91
See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(d),
202(a) (1930); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 1(b), 202(a) (1928).
92
See infra p. 220 (appendix table).
93
See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 202(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. § 202(a) (1930);
H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. § 202(a) (1928).
94
H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); H.R. 9285,
70th Cong. § 304 (1928).
95
See S. 211, 72d Cong. (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. (1931); H.R. 17168, 71st Cong.
(1931); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. (1931).
96
See H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. § 34 (1931).
97
See S. 4567, 72 Cong., § 202(a) (1932).
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The 1932 provision, however, differed in two material respects from the
prior bills. First, it applied to personal injury, death, and property damage
claims.98 Second, the Senate bill provided that not only must “reasonable
cause” be shown to trigger the tolling provision, but that plaintiffs suing the
United States in tort were required to “prove affirmatively that the United
States has not been prejudiced thereby.”99 Additionally, the House held
hearings in 1932 to discuss H.R. 5065, which proposed that a property
damage, personal injury, or death claim must be submitted to the agency
involved or the Comptroller General within thirty days from the date the
claim accrued. 100 The claimant would then have one year after an agency
denial to file suit in the Court of Claims.101 At the hearing, the House
subcommittee wrestled with the issue of whether the thirty-day time frame
was sufficient and whether, with such a short limitations period, private
bills of relief waiving the statute of limitations should eventually be passed
to ensure that a claimant could have his or her tort claim adjudicated. 102
Between 1933 and 1935, bills introduced in the Senate retained the
“reasonable cause” and proof-of-no-prejudice provisions for all tort
claims,103 but the House bills during that same period did not contain any
tolling provisions at all. 104 During the 1933-1935 period, the House and
Senate also prescribed different limitations periods for property damage
claims on the one hand, and personal injury and death claims, on the
other.105 Only one 1934 House bill provided for a uniform limitations
period of three years, but like the other House bills during the 1933-1935
period, that bill did not provide for equitable tolling. 106
In 1939, however, H.R. 7236 and S. 2690, which were introduced in
the House and Senate, dropped all equitable tolling provisions and set the
limitations period for all tort claims at one year. A plaintiff whose claim
was below one thousand dollars, and was submitted to an agency for
possible settlement, had six months to file suit in federal court after the
agency denied the claim. 107 The statute of limitations provisions in H.R.

98

See id., § 1(c) (property damage claims), § 202(a) (personal injury and death claims).
See id.
100
H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1931).
101
See id. § 303(2).
102
See Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong. 13-14,
28-30, 34 (1932) (hereinafter 1932 House Hearings).
103
See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(c) (property damage claims), 202(a) (personal injury
claims) (1935); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(c) (property damage claims), 202(a) (personal
injury claims) (1933).
104
See H.R. 2028, 74th Cong. (1935); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. (1933).
105
See infra p. 220 (appendix table).
106
See H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. §10 (1934).
107
See S. 2690, 76th Cong. § 301 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong. § 301 (1939).
99
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7236 and S. 2690 were discussed in 1940 before the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees. Attorney General Frank Murphy submitted a
statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, in which he applauded the
limitations periods for being “short.”108 A House Judiciary Committee
report prepared by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York (the
sponsor of H.R. 7236) stated that the one-year limitations period prescribed
for the Act “appears desirable in order to preclude possible prejudice to the
Government.”109 According to a House Report, the six-month period
“extended” the limitations period until the agency finally disposed of the
claim. 110
Judge Alexander Holtzoff, acting as Special Assistant to Attorney
General Murphy, testified about the proposed one-year time period. He
noted that a short statute of limitations was necessary, but that in cases of
undue hardship, the claimant could still petition Congress for a private bill
of relief, which was the traditional method for seeking tort compensation.
His remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee are noteworthy:
Section 301 of Title III . . . provides for a statute of limitations of 1 year
on these claims. It seemed to us that a short statute of limitations, such
as 1 year, is necessary for the purpose of protecting the interests of the
Government, and is not unfair to the claimant, because the lawyer of
the claimant should be able to bring this suit within 1 year after the
cause of action has accrued. If unusual cases of hardship arise, the
claimant may still have recourse to a private bill, over which the claims
111
committee would have jurisdiction.

Judge Holtzoff echoed that sentiment before the House, when he
engaged in the following exchange with Representative Celler of New
York and Representative John Robsion of Kentucky:
M R. HOLTZOFF: . . . Title III contains provisions applicable to all
claims under the act whether they are for less than $1,000 and
submitted for administrative determination, or whether they are tried in
court.
M R. CELLER: Is 1 year a long enough time in which to present a claim?
M R. HOLTZOFF: Of course, it is a question, and it is subject to debate.
We have a short statute of limitation of 1 year, but my thought is that,
of course, there will be cases in which this will be too short a time.

108

H.R. REP . NO . 76-2428, at 5 (1940) [hereinafter H.R. REP . NO . 2428]; Tort Claims
Against the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 76th Cong. 11 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 Senate Hearings] (statement of Frank
Murphy, Attorney General of the United States).
109
H.R. REP . NO . 2428, at 5.
110
See id.
111
1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 108, at 38 (emphasis added).
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M R. CELLER: I had this in mind, that if you make it so short, then you
will have lots of claims filed in Congress again.
M R. HOLTZOFF: Yes; you will undoubtedly have private bills with that
statute of limitations. Of course, you have bills of that kind now, and
we have even a 6-year statute in contract cases. I might say this, that
we had in mind that a tort claim is sometimes difficult to defend, and
the longer your suit is postponed the more difficult it is to get evidence
to defend it.
M R. ROBSION: Most of the States have a 1-year limitation, or a great
many of them do.
M R. HOLTZOFF: I think that some of them do. The State of New York,
I think, has a 3-year limitation on tort actions against private
individuals, and a 6-year statute on contract claims; but it seems to me
that this is one of those provisions that is properly subject to debate. It
might properly be increased if the feeling of the committee is that the
time is too short. It is one of those things that cannot be answered
“Yes” or “No.” I do feel, as you suggest Mr. Chairman [Celler], that if
you make the time too short, you will be confronted with private bills as
to individual claimants waiving the statute as to that particular claim
112
because the claimant abandons his rights, or something of that kind.

Judge Holtzoff’s testimony plainly suggests that if an FTCA plaintiff
could not comply with the time periods prescribed in the Act’s statute of
limitations, then a tort remedy (in the form of a private bill of relief) would
lie with Congress, not with the courts. That, of course, was the view
expressed in the 1932 House hearings.113 The 1940 Senate and House
Hearings provided the only analysis of the statute of limitations, and the
statute of limitations enacted in 1946 was, in all material respects, the same
as the one discussed by Judge Holtzoff.114 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly relied upon the 1940 legislative history, including Judge
Holtzoff’s remarks, to ascertain Congress’s intent with respect to various
provisions of the FTCA.115 So have a number of lower federal courts.116

112

Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 21 (1940) (hereinafter 1940 House Hearings)
(testimony of Alexander Holtzoff) (emphasis added).
113
See 1932 House Hearings, supra note 102, at 13-14, 28-30, 34.
114
The only addition to the statute of limitations after 1939 was the six-month
limitations period applicable to suits filed after a claimant withdraws a claim from agency
consideration. See H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., § 401 (1941); S. 2207, 77th Cong. § 401 (1942).
115
See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 202-03 n.4 (1993) (looking to S. 2690 and
H.R. 7236 for original understanding of the foreign country exception of the FTCA and
comparing that to 1942 changes); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55, 59 (1985)
(relying on Judge Holtzoff’s discussion of the assault and battery exception); United States
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808-09 &
n.8 (1984) (looking to S. 2690 and H.R. 7236 for original understanding of discretionary
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The commentary that immediately followed passage of the FTCA
supports the view that the limitations periods prescribed in the original Act
should not be extended. One commentator, who described the limitations
periods as “strictly operative,” agreed that failure to comply with the Act’s
limitations provisions meant that tort compensation would come from a
private bill of relief: “The claimant’s failure to make timely presentation
still leaves him the alternative of obtaining a special Act waiving the
defense of the statute of limitations . . . in such instances as the Congress
may desire to set aside the statutory bar.”117 Another commentator, Judge
Ben Moore of West Virginia, noted the “peculiarity” of the Act’s statute of
limitations, and concluded that the limitations provisions do not contain a
“saving clause or provision which would toll the statute where infants,
insane persons, or others under disability are concerned.”118 To Judge
Moore, this was unusual because such tolling provisions are “ordinarily
found” in federal and state statutes of limitations.119 And, Professor
Borchard commented that with the Act’s “short” statute of limitations, “it is
possible that claims will still be presented to Congress.”120
Most importantly, however, equitable tolling was included in nine of
function exception and comparing that to 1942 changes); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S.
848, 858 n.17 (1984) (looking to testimony of Judge Holtzoff for congressional intent
behind 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1994)); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460,
463-64 & n.4 (1980) (same); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 n.11, 28 nn.17, 20 &
45 (1953) (looking to S. 2690 and H.R. 7236 for original understanding of discretionary
function exception and comparing that to 1942 changes; pinning congressional intent on
Judge Holtzoff’s discussion regarding the need for wrongful conduct, and that the FTCA did
not contemplate liability without fault).
116
See Brock v. United States, 601 F.2d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1979) (relying on testimony
of Judge Holtzoff regarding meaning of “law of the place” in the FTCA); United States v.
Cohen, 389 F.2d 689, 691 & nn.13, 14 (5th Cir. 1967) (relying on H.R. 7236 hearings for
congressional intent behind attorneys’ fees provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2678 (2000)); Panella
v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1954) (relying on Judge Holtzoff’s
testimony for an understanding of the assault and battery exception of the FTCA);
Suchomajcz v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 474, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (relying on Judge
Holtzoff’s testimony regarding the postal exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b)); In re Bomb
Disaster at Roseville, Cal., on Apr. 28, 1973, 438 F. Supp. 769, 777-78, 782 (E.D. Cal.
1977) (relying on Judge Holtzoff’s testimony regarding whether the FTCA precludes
imposing strict liability on the United States); Adams v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 254 F.
Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (citing Supreme Court’s reliance on Judge Holtzoff’s
testimony in Dalehite); Colorado Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 787, 791
(D. Colo. 1963) (relying on Judge Holtzoff’s testimony regarding the purpose of the
exceptions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680).
117
Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims ActA Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO .
L.J. 1, 40 (1946).
118
Ben Moore, Federal Tort Claims Act: Useful Discussion at Fourth Circuit
Conference, 33 A.B.A. J. 857, 860 (1947).
119
See id.
120
Edwin Borchard, Tort Claims Against the Government: Municipal, State and Federal
Liability, 33 A.B.A. J. 221, 222 (1947).

COLELLA FORMATTED.DOC

196

2/7/2001 11:41 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:174

the thirty-one bills prior to the enactment of the FTCA,121 though the Act
passed by the 1946 Congress did not provide for any equitable tolling of
the limitations periods. Judge Moore’s observation in 1947 that the Act did
not provide for tolling based on minority or mental disability was entirely
correct, for six of the thirty-one pre-enactment legislative proposals did
include tolling for infants, insane persons, and others under disability. 122
Courts, therefore, should conclude that the enacting Congress did not
intend equitable tolling to apply to FTCA cases.
This conclusion flows naturally from the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Muniz.123 There, the Court decided whether prisoners
could bring FTCA claims. In reaching the conclusion that prisoners may
bring such suits against the United States, the Muniz Court examined the
pre-enactment legislative history and noted that several pre-enactment
proposals contained provisions that precluded prisoners from bringing tort
claims, but that the enacted version of the FTCA did not contain any such
exception. 124 The Court stated:
Six of the 31 bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1946
either barred prisoners from suing while in federal prison or precluded
suit upon any claim for injury to or death of a prisoner. That such an
exception was absent from the Act itself is significant in view of the
consistent course of development of the bills proposed over the years
and the marked reliance by each succeeding Congress upon the
language of the earlier bills. We therefore feel that the want of an
exception for prisoners’ claims reflects a deliberate choice, rather than
125
an inadvertent omission.

The reasoning in Muniz cannot be meaningfully distinguished from
the point we are making here. Equitable tolling provisions were included
in several pre-enactment bills, so that, under the reasoning in Muniz, courts
may conclude that the enacting Congress was well aware of equitable
tolling when it passed the FTCA in 1946. However, the 1946 Congress

121

See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(c), 202(a) (1935); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(c), 202(a);
S. 4567, 72d Cong. §§ 1(c), 202(a); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. § 34 (1931); H.R. 15428, 71st
Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1930); H.R. 9285, 70th
Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1928); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th
Cong. §§ 202(c), 305 (1926).
122
See H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. § 34 (1931); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); S.
4377, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. § 304 (1928); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §
304 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. § 305 (1926).
123
374 U.S. 150 (1963).
124
See id. at 156.
125
Id. (emphasis added); see also Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 22223 (1945) (looking to pre-enactment history of Public Vessels Act and drawing conclusions
about congressional intent from absence of language in final act that was present in preenactment proposals).
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declined to include any of those equitable tolling provisions in the Act that
was finally passed. Thus, as in Muniz, Congress’s decision not to include
equitable tolling in the original FTCA must be construed as a “deliberate
choice, rather than an inadvertent omission.”126
B. The 1949 Changes to the FTCA’s Statute of Limitations
While the initial batch of FTCA cases percolated through the courts,
the one-year period worked an injustice in many cases. Indeed, between
1946 and 1949, many FTCA suits were dismissed pursuant to the
limitations period, with courts strictly adhering to the one-year time
frame.127 Accordingly, and consistent with Judge Holtzoff’s suggestion in
1940 that Congress could lengthen the limitation period if it found the
period to be too short, the 1949 Congress extended the one-year limitations
period to two years. The bill originally introduced in the House prescribed
a three-year limitations period, but when it emerged from the House
Judiciary Committee, the three-year period was replaced with a two-year
period. 128 The House Judiciary Committee explained the reasons for
expanding the FTCA’s limitations period to two years:
The committee feels that, in comparison to analogous State and Federal
statutes of limitation, the existing 1-year period is too short and tends
toward injustice in many instances.
...
It will be observed, then, from the foregoing statistics that the existing
limitations of 1 year in the Federal Tort Claims Act is manifestly unjust
and not in consonance with the practice prevailing in analogous
departments of the law.
...
The 1-year existing period is unfair to some claimants who suffered
injuries which did not fully develop until after the expiration of the
period for making claims. Moreover, the wide area of operations of the
Federal agencies, particularly the armed-services agencies, would
increase the possibility that notice of the wrongful death of a deceased
to his next of kin would be so long delayed in going through channels
126

Id.
See Anderegg v. United States, 171 F.2d 127, 128 (4th Cir. 1948) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869,
873-74 (4th Cir. 1947); Franzino v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.N.J. 1949); Marino
v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Wickman v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 78 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D. Minn. 1948); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 951, 954 (E.D. Va. 1948); Turkett v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 769, 770-71
(N.D.N.Y. 1948).
128
H.R. REP . NO . 276, supra note 24, at 4; see also H.R. REP . NO . 1754, supra note 24,
at 1.
127
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of communication that the notice would arrive at a time when the
running of the statute had already barred the institution of a claim or
suit.
It is not the intention of the Federal Government to deprive tort
claimants to their day in court or of their remedies. Nor, on the other
hand, does it propose to encourage delay in the enforcement of a
claimant’s rights or to harass the Federal agencies in their defense
against such suits by increasing the difficulty of their procurement of
evidence. However, it is not believed that the enlargement of the
existing period of limitations to 2 years as proposed . . . will
unnecessarily vex the agencies concerned, nor will it foster a lack of
diligence on the part of claimants in the prosecution of their claims.
The period of 2 years proposed in the bill represents a happy medium
which has been tested and found satisfactory in the laboratory of legal
129
experience.

The report that the Senate Judiciary Committee published contained
the same language as the House report.130 The plain import of the language
in the 1949 Senate and House reports, like the testimony of Judge Holtzoff
in 1940, indicates that Congress intended to cure the perceived unfairness
in the FTCA’s statute of limitations by extending the limitations period
applicable to all FTCA suits. The language does not imply that Congress
intended to incorporate equitable tolling into the Act and create special
exceptions for narrow classes of cases. As we said in our 1999 paper, the
two-year perioda “happy medium,” according to the 1949
Congressreflects a congressional balance between compensating tort
victims and protecting the United States against defending stale claims.131
Indeed, H.R. 2403, a bill introduced in the House in 1949, would have
permitted a maximum five-year extension of the two-year limitations
period on the basis of equitable factors such as infancy and insanity. In
particular, the bill proposed a subsection (c) to 28 U.S.C. § 2401 that would
have provided the following:
(c) The time within which an action may be brought on a tort claim
against the United States, or within which such claim may be presented
for administrative settlement, shall not include any period during which
a person entitled to bring such action or present such claim is under the
age of twenty-one or is insane, or both, if any such disability of infancy
or insanity, or both, exists when such claim accrues. The expiration of
such time shall not be delayed for more than five years by reason of the
132
disability of insanity.
129
130
131
132

H.R. REP . NO . 276, supra note 24, at 2-4 (emphasis added).
See S. REP . NO . 135, supra note 24, at 2, 4.
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 909.
H.R. 2403, 81st Cong., (1949).
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H.R. 2403 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on
February 7, 1949. However, the House Judiciary Committee Report we
have quoted above was issued approximately one month later, and H.R.
2403 is not even mentioned. Although failed legislative proposals are
generally frowned upon when used as evidence of the intent of a prior
Congress,133 that surely cannot be the case here. Congress changed the
statute of limitations in 1949, and one may properly look to the proposals
that were submitted and rejectedfor example, the proposal that would
have expanded the limitations period to three yearsfor indications of
what the Congress may have intended. Indeed, the only inferences that can
be drawn from the fact that H.R. 2403 failed to pass support the position
that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply. Either Congress
rejected the notion that equitable considerations such as minority and
insanity could toll the statute of limitations, or the 1949 expansion of the
statute of limitations incorporated such considerations (although we
question the accuracy of this latter interpretation). Both interpretations
support the conclusion that Congress extended the statute of limitations in
1949 to account for inequities in its application. 134
The possibility that Congress may have incorporated equitable tolling
considerations into the 1949 changes to the Act by extending the statute of
limitations brings us to another critical point. The Supreme Court and
lower courts have held that the FTCA’s two-year limitations period is tied
to a discovery rule of accrual, in which a claim does not accrueand the
limitations period does not begin to rununtil the claimant knows, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of her ni jury and its
cause.135 This rule of accrual meets the 1949 House Judiciary Committee’s
concern that the FTCA’s statute of limitations could be “unfair to some
claimants who suffered injuries which did not fully develop until after the
expiration of the period for making claim.”136 The Supreme Court in

133

See infra note 167 (authorities cited therein).
Cf. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1998) (declining to
draw inference in favor of government where failure of legislation could have meant
something contrary to the government’s position).
135
See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); Johnson v. Smithsonian
Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999); Diaz v. United States, 165 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th
Cir. 1999); Lhotka v. United States, 114 F.3d 751, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1997); Bartleson v.
United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1277 (9th Cir. 1996); Kerstetter v. United States, 57 F.3d 362,
364 (4th Cir. 1995); MacMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1995);
Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994); Indus. Constructors Corp. v.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 969 (10th Cir. 1994); McDonald v. United States,
843 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1988); Barren ex rel. Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 633
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Nicolazzo v. United States, 786 F.2d 454, 455 (1st Cir. 1986).
136
H.R. REP . NO . 276, supra note 24, at 3; S. REP . NO . 135, supra note 24, at 2; H.R.
134
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Beggerly held that this precise rule of accrual, found in the text of the Quiet
Title Act, already contemplates equitable tolling-like considerations,
thereby precluding any further tolling for judge-made equitable reasons.137
C. The 1966 Changes to the FTCA’s Statute of Limitations
Congress amended the FTCA’s statute of limitations again in 1966,
when it imposed a mandatory administrative-exhaustion requirement on
FTCA plaintiffs and imposed a corresponding six-month limitations period
for filing suit after a claim is finally denied by an agency. 138 The Justice
Department drafted the proposed legislation, and Assistant Attorney
General John W. Douglas was the only individual to provide testimony on
the 1966 changes to the FTCA. At the hearing before the House Judiciary
Committee, Representative William L. Hungate of Missouri expressed
concern about the proposed mandatory administrative-presentment
requirement, fearing that FTCA plaintiffs would be delayed in seeking
redress in federal court. Mr. Douglas responded to this concern by pointing
out that, in exchange for the mandatory administrative-presentment
requirement, FTCA cla imants would have an additional six months within
which to bring their tort claims against the United States. This point was
made in the following exchange between Mr. Douglas and Representative
Hungate:
M R. HUNGATE: Yes. Now, what about the statute of limitations? Will
this [mandatory administrative-presentment requirement] have any
effect on the statute of limitations?
M R. DOUGLAS: The statute of limitations is set out in the bill. It
actually expands the time within which a suit could be filed in court.
At the present time there is a 2-year statute of limitations, and this bill
permits 2 years to file with the agency plus 6 months after the agency
acts or refuses to act.
M R. HUNGATE: In other words, the statute of limitations is extended or
would be extended by this 6-month period?
139

M R. DOUGLAS: That is right.

Thus, to accommodate the new mandatory administrative-exhaustion
REP . NO . 1754, supra note 24, at 3.
137
See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998) (“Here, the QTA, by providing
that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff ‘knew or should have
known of the claim of the United States,’ has already effectively allowed for equitable
tolling.”).
138
See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
139
Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation:
Hearing Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings] (testimony of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney
General) (emphasis added).
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requirement, the 1966 changes had the added benefit of expanding the
then-applicable two-year limitations period to include an additional six
months to file suit after administrative remedies had been exhausted. The
view expressed in 1966 is fully consistent with the 1940 view of the sixmonth limitations period, namely, that it operated as an extension of the
time within which to bring a tort claim against the United States.140 In
addition, in 1966, the Act’s statute of limitations was “simplif[ied]” to
reflect the new changes to the procedure for adjudicating tort claims against
the United States.141 The 1966 Congress intended this new administrativeexhaustion procedure, combined with the corresponding limitations
periods, to expedite the resolution of tort claims brought against the United
States. According to reports from the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, the 1966 changes had the “purpose of providing for more fair
and equitable treatment of private individuals and claimants when they
deal with the Government or are involved in litigation with their
Government.”142 Moreover, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
also concluded that “the more expeditious procedures provided by this bill
will have the effect of reducing the number of pending claims which may
become stale and long delayed because of the extended time required for
their consideration.”143
Although Congress added these procedures for a more expeditious
consideration of tort claims, the 1966 congressional amendments did not
make equitable tolling applicable to tort suits against the United States.
This was not because Congress thought equitable tolling would
automatically be incorporated into a statute that was silent on the issue. To
the contrary, the 1966 Congress legislated against the backdrop of the
Court’s decision in Soriano, which held that when Congress prescribes a
limitations period, it means “just that period and no more.”144 The
Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress is aware of background
legal principles when it enacts legislation and that those background
principles must be considered when ascertaining congressional intent.145
140

See H.R. REP . NO . 2428, supra note 108, at 5.
H.R. REP . NO . 1532, supra note 25, at 5; S. REP . NO . 1327, supra note 25, at 8.
142
H.R. REP . NO . 1532, supra note 25, at 5 (emphasis added); S. REP . NO . 1327, supra
note 25, at 2.
143
H.R. REP . NO . 1532, supra note 25, at 6 (emphasis added); S. REP . NO . 1327, supra
note 25, at 2.
144
Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); see also Library of Cong. v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986) (holding that waivers of sovereign immunity “must” be
read against the backdrop of judicial decisions concerning the matter for which immunity is
claimed to be waived), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
145
See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230-31 (1996); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1992); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
141
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Nor can the 1966 Congress’s failure to include equitable tolling in the
FTCA be explained by saying that Congress did not consider the subject.
We know this because that same year, 1966, in the same set of FTCA
bills,146 Congress enacted a three-year limitations period for tort claims
brought by the United States that explicitly provided for equitable tolling in
certain limited circumstances.147 It surely does not strain the interpretive
imagination to conclude that Congress’s decision to include equitable
tolling in tort cases brought by the federal government, but not to include
equitable tolling in tort cases brought against the government, means that
Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply to FTCA
casesespecially with Soriano in the background.
D. The 1988 Changes to the FTCA’s Statute of Limitations
A new statute of limitations problem arose with the mandatory
administrative-presentment requirement. Between 1966 and the 1980s,
many tort plaintiffs sued federal employees in state court, only to learn later
that the employee was a federal employee acting within the scope of her
employment at the time the tortious act or omission occurred. Under the
1966 changes to the FTCA, the United States was deemed the only proper
party in tort cases involving certified federal employees, thereby triggering
the mandatory administrative-presentment requirement.148 In many cases,
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696-97 (1979).
146
See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY , ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
CERTAIN ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT, H.R. REP . NO . 1534, 89th Cong. 3
(1966).
147
See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1994) (statute of limitations); § 2415(e) (1994) (tolling
provision); § 2416 (1994) (tolling provisions). In particular, the three-year limitations
period applicable to tort suits brought by the United States may be equitably tolled under the
following circumstances: (1) if the United States’ tort suit is dismissed without prejudice,
the government can bring a second, otherwise time-barred suit if that second suit is filed
within one year after the dismissal [under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(e)]; (2) “the defendant or the res
is outside the United States, its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(a)]; (3) “the defendant is exempt
from legal process because of infancy, mental incompetence, diplomatic immunity, or for
any other reason” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(b)]; (4) “facts material to the right of action are
not known and reasonably could not be known by an offical of the United States charged
with the responsibility to act in the circumstances” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c)]; or (5) “the
United States is in a state of war declared pursuant to Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution of the United States” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(d)].
148
See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994) (“Subject to the provisions of this title relating to civil
actions on tort claims against the United States, any such award, compromise, settlement, or
determination shall be final and conclusive on all officers of the Government . . . .”); §
2679(b)(1) (1994) (“The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and
2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or
resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any
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by the time a plaintiff discovered that an administrative claim had to be
filed with the appropriate federal agency, the two-year limitations period
for such claims had expired. Thus, FTCA plaintiffs invoked the doctrine of
equitable tolling to save their claims, making the same arguments that won
the day in cases involving private tort defendants. Federal courts, however,
were not swayed. In nearly all cases, courts declined to equitably toll the
two-year limitations period, despite the admitted inequities that would
result.149 For example, in Wollman v. Gross,150 the Eighth Circuit
recognized the “harsh ramific ations” of applying the two-year time period
strictly in federal employee cases, but nevertheless concluded that
“Congress has chosen to [impose the two-year time period] and any change
is its prerogative and not that of the courts.”151
In 1988, Congress did just that, and once again changed the FTCA by
passing the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation
Act.152 This amendment provided a procedure for substituting the United
States as the proper party defendant in tort cases brought against federal
employees acting within the scope of their employment when the tortious

other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of
such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or
relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is
precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.”).
149
See Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting that reasoning of cases denying relief where limitations period has run before
discovery of employee status is “persuasive”); Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121,
123 (4th Cir. 1986) (dismissing claim for failure to comply with two-year limitations period
despite plaintiff not knowing employment status of tortfeasor until it was too late); Rogers
v. United States, 675 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Neither plaintiff’s lack of knowledge
regarding Stennies’ federal employment nor the United States’ removal of this case from
state court to district court eliminates the jurisdictional requirement that a timely
administrative claim be filed.”); Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980)
(recognizing “especially harsh ramifications” but declining to extend the two-year period
“whenever plaintiff is unaware of the status of the defendant as a federal employee acting
within the scope of his employment”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Flickinger v.
United States, 523 F. Supp. 1372, 1375-76 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (declining to equitably toll
limitations period where plaintiff did not discover that tortfeasor was federal employee until
after two-year period expired); Dunaville v. Carnago, 485 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (same); Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604, 606 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Binn v.
United States, 389 F. Supp. 988, 991-93 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (same); Baker v. United States,
341 F. Supp. 494, 495-96 (D. Md. 1972) (same). But cf. Staples v. United States, 740 F.2d
766, 768 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that FTCA plaintiff, who sues federal employee in state
court, satisfies presentment requirement); Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 266 (2d
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
150
637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
151
Id. at 549.
152
Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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act or omission occurred. 153 The 1988 changes to the FTCA were largely
aimed at curing the problems produced by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Westfall v. Erwin,154 which held that federal employees could be personally
liable in tort, unless they could prove they were acting within the scope of
their employment and their actions were cloaked in government
discretion.155 Fearing a massive expansion of tort liability, Congress acted
swiftly and decisively, crafting a precise scheme for substituting the United
States for the employee as the proper party-defendant.156
Congress, however, went further than just crafting a new substitution
procedure. To remedy the perceived unfairness of barring plaintiffs who
found out too late that the United States was the proper party-defendant,
Congress provided for equitable tolling of the two-year period in limited
circumstances. Specifically, Congress extended the two-year limitations
period where the administrative claim would have been timely filed with an
agency on the date suit was filed against the employee, as long as the claim
was presented to the appropriate federal agency within sixty days of the
dismissal of the action. 157 The House Report accompanying the 1988
changes states:
[S]ection 8 also contains provisions to ensure that no one is unfairly
affected by the procedural ramifications of this provision.
For
example, if an injury has occurred before H.R. 4612 is enacted, but no
lawsuit has yet been filed relative to that claim, the claimant will have
to pursue a remedy against the United States, not against the employee.
If a lawsuit has been filed, but it has not proceeded to final judgment,
the United States will be substituted for the employee (or, if the lawsuit
has been filed against both the United States and the employee, the
employee will be dismissed from the suit), and resolution will occur
accordingly.
Under H.R. 4612, no one who previously had the right to initiate a
lawsuit will lose that right. Similarly, no one who has already initiated

153

See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)-(5) (1994).
484 U.S. 292 (1988), superseded by statute as stated in Gutierrez de Martinez v.
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995).
155
See id. at 299.
156
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)-(2); § 2679 (d)(1)-(5).
157
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5); see also Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d 410, 412
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing the inequitable circumstances that preceded the 1988 changes
to the FTCA); Bewely v. Campanile, 87 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D.R.I. 2000) (“In cases where
the United States is substituted as a defendant, [§ 2679(d)(5)] provides relief from the twoyear period of limitations . . . .”); Filaski v. United States, 776 F. Supp. 115, 117 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (“[A]s to a situation in which the United States is substituted as defendant, . . . the
FTCA provides protection for the plaintiff who has no knowledge of the federal presence in
a case.”); Egan v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing the
equitable tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5)).
154
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a suit will lose their claims solely because the procedural prerequisites
associated with the FTCA are being made applicable. Persons who
have a claim, but have not initiated a lawsuit, will still be allowed to
submit an administrative claim against the United States for up to two
years after the date of enactment, or within the time remaining under
what otherwise would be the applicable state statute of limitations.
Persons who have initiated a lawsuit but never submitted an
administrative claim to the Government will not lose their right to
pursue a lawsuit for having failed to submit such a claim. Instead, as
long as their suit was timely under state law when it was filed, they will
158
have at least 60 more days to file a timely administrative claim.

Thus, just like it did in 1949, Congress changed the Act’s statute of
limitations in 1988 to account for inequities in its application.
V. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT ANSWER TO THE
BEGGERLY-BROCKAMP QUESTION
This rather extended discussion of the FTCA’s legislative history
demonstrates that Congress has modified the limitations periods in the Act
when those periods produced seemingly inequitable results. The one-year
period in the original Act was applauded for being “short,” and the
recommended remedy for failing to comply with that time period was a
private bill from Congress. The firm, one-year period stood in sharp
contrast to many of the pre-enactment proposals, which made some form of
equitable tolling available. However, in 1949, Congress extended the oneyear time period to two years because the one-year period proved to be
“manifestly unjust” and “tend[ed] toward injustice in many instances.”159
In 1966, the statute of limitations provided claimants with an additional six
months to bring a tort claim against the United States. That change,
combined with the new administrative-exhaustion requirement, was
designed to provide for more “fair and equitable treatment” of FTCA
plaintiffs.160 That same year, and in the same set of bills, Congress
provided for equitable tolling in tort cases brought by the federal
government.
Finally, in 1988, Congress remedied the possible
“unfair[ness]” that would result from the substitution procedure by
providing equitable tolling in the text of the Act.161 Courts often analyze
the history of a waiver-of-immunity-statute to determine congressional

158

H.R. REP . NO . 100-700, at 7, 8 (1988) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter H.R. REP . NO . 100-700].
159
H.R. REP . NO . 276, supra note 24, at 2, 3; S. REP . NO . 135, supra note 24, at 3, 4;
H.R. REP . NO . 1754, supra note 24, at 2, 3.
160
See H.R. REP . NO . 1532, supra note 25, at 5; S. REP . NO . 1327, supra note 25, at 2.
161
See H.R. REP . NO . 100-700, supra note 158, at 7.
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intent.162
Accordingly, the point here is not simply that Congress’s failure to
include equitable tolling for particular circumstances equals an intent to
preclude equitable tolling in other circumstances. Rather, we have shown
that, unlike many other waiver statutes, Congress has been actively
involved in modifying the FTCA’s statute of limitations. Furthermore,
each time it has done so, Congress has extended the limitations period for
equitable reasonsin 1949, by one year; in 1966, by six months; and in
1988, by sixty days. The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hen Congress
acts to amend a statute it intends its amendment to have real and substantia l
effect.”163 If judge-made equitable tolling were available in 1949, 1966,
and 1988, there would have been no need for Congress to make the
changes that it didespecially in 1988, when it provided for equitable
tolling in the text of the Act itself.
Let us come back, then, to the statement in Perez v. United States and
Stanfill v. United States that “deductions from congressional inaction are
notoriously unreliable.”164
The legislative history presented here
demonstrates that this statement is simply irrelevant to the question of
whether the FTCA’s limitations periods should be equitably tolled. Here,
Congress has acted, and we can naturally infer an intent from those actions.
Additionally, we have not relied upon minor, potentially out-of-context
expressions of congressional intent that are often cited by textualists and
intentionalists as a reason for rejecting the use of legislative history in
statutory construction.165 Rather, we have presented a relatively consistent
story of congressional intent, with no counter-indications from crafty
legislators, in which Congress has considered equitable tolling several
times and specifically codified equitable tolling for limited situations. No
leap of faith is required to conclude that Congress intended to preclude

162

See, e.g., West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 214-19 (1999) (tracing the history of Title
VII); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1985) (tracing history of changes to
assault and battery exception in FTCA); United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425
U.S. 164, 166-67 (1976) (tracing the history of the Suits in Admiralty Act); Marine Coatings
of Alabama. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1996) (tracing the history of
the Public Vessels Act).
163
Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).
164
Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindahl v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 803 n.3 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)); Stanfill v. United States,
43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
165
See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 51, at 810 (“Committee reports are written and floor
statements are often made for the very purpose of influencing the courts.”); SCALIA, supra
note 51, at 34 (“Nowadays . . . when it is universally known and expected that judges will
resort to floor debates and (especially) committee reports as authoritative expressions of
‘legislative intent,’ affecting the courts rather than informing the Congress has become the
primary purpose of the exercise.”).
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equitable tolling in other circumstances. Justice Holmes wrote that “it is
not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are
driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as
before.”166
Moreover, we have not relied upon legislative history of the sort
indicated by Perez and Stanfill, namely, legislative proposals that were
considered in subsequent Congresses that did not change the statute of
limitations. We specifically disavowed that approach in our 1999 paper.167
To the contrary, we have pointed to the pre-enactment legislative history,
which the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon as probative of
congressional intent.168 Indeed, the Court’s Muniz decision, which is
merely one of several Supreme Court decisions that rely upon the FTCA’s
pre-enactment legislative history, supports the view that pre-enactment
proposals are highly probative of Congress’s intent when it enacted the
statute in 1946. 169 We have also relied upon the legislative history
accompanying the 1949, 1966, and 1988 changes to the Act’s statute of
166

Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 910-11 n.119. In particular, we declined to
rely on equitable tolling proposals that were introduced in the House in 1989 because
Congress did not change the FTCA’s statute of limitations that year. See id. Had we relied
upon those 1989 proposals, we would have run afoul of the well-established Supreme Court
authority to which Perez and Stanfill referred. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (“We have stated, however, that
failed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an
interpretation of a prior statute.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (“[S]ubsequent legislative history is a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress.”) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) (“[S]tatutes are construed
by the courts with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the passage. The
interpretation placed upon an existing statute by a subsequent group of Congressmen who
are promoting legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive significance here.”);
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”); United States v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947) (“We fail to see how the remarks of these
Senators in 1943 can serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed in 1932 . .
. .”).
Even so, the Court has not always been consistent on this point, especially in the
waiver-of-sovereign-immunity context generally, and in the FTCA context in particular.
See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 & n.11 (1994) (mentioning failed legislative
proposals considered by Congress in support of Court’s conclusion that “[w]e leave it to
Congress to weigh the implications of such a significant expansion of Government
liability”); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 686-88 & n.6 (1987) (citing failed
legislative proposals in support of Court’s conclusion that it declined to allow service
members to bring medical malpractice suits against the United States); Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (citing failed legislative proposals as support for Court’s conclusion
that “Congress has not taken action . . . that would expand the exclusivity of FTCA”).
168
See supra note 81 (authorities cited therein).
169
See id.
167
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limitations—legislative evidence that courts have routinely consulted for
ascertaining congressional intent.170 Thus, all of this legislative evidence,
with its documented impact on judicial interpretations of the FTCA, cannot
simply be dismissed as “equivocal” or “scant,” 171 especially because the
Perez and Stanfill courts did not take a hard look at the Act’s legislative
history.
The picture that emerges from an analysis of the FTCA’s legislative
history is that, as originally enacted, Congress did not intend equitable
tolling to apply. Instead, Congress envisioned that a private bill of relief
provided the proper remedy for failure to comply with the Act’s limitations
periods.
Attorney General Murphy’s statements, Judge Holtzoff’s
testimony, and the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision, support this
conclusion. 172
To conclude that equitable tolling is permissible in FTCA cases, one
would have to find that, when the statute of limitations was changed in
1949, 1966, and 1988, Congress did an about-face and intended to permit
the judiciary to expand the limitations period through the doctrine of
equitable tolling. As we have shown, the legislative history compels
precisely the opposite conclusion. Congress modified the limitations
period to account for inequitable circumstances, expanding the period from
one to two years in 1949, adding an additional six months in 1966, and
including equitable tolling in the text of the Act in 1988. These affirmative
congressional actions belie any suggestion that Congress intended the
courts, through the doctrine of equitable tolling, to cure any unfairness that
may flow from the Act’s limitations periods.
Perhaps the legislative history of the FTCA’s statute of limitations is
accorded little weight because of the perception that, unlike the tax-refund
statute in Brockamp and the Quiet Title Act in Beggerly, equitable tolling
has historically been applied to the run-of-the-mill tort action. 173
Accordingly, by putting the United States on a par with private tort
defendants, one might argue that Congress may have intended for equitable
tolling to apply to tort claims brought against the United States.174 This
170

See supra note 81 (authorities cited therein).
See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1999); Stanfill v. United
States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
172
See supra Part IV.A.
173
See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
T ORTS §§ 1, 3, at 6, 15-20 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (presenting the
underlying principles of tort law).
174
See Forman v. United States, No. Civ.A.98-6784, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 6, 1999) (“[T]ort law historically has accounted for individual facts, balancing
analyses, and equitable considerations . . . . Unlike cases recently considered by the Court,
the very nature of tort law suggests that equitable considerations are proper under the
171
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argument has surface appeal, for it is plain that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Irwin was crafted to avoid the anomalous result that Title VII
claims involving private defendants would be subject to equitable tolling,
whereas the same claims against the United States would not.175 In fact, the
legislative history accompanying Title VII specifically supported the
conclusion that the time periods in that statute may be equitably tolled. 176
This anomaly, however, does not arise in the FTCA context. It is no
doubt true that the FTCA holds the United States liable in tort in the same
manner as a private defendant in the locality within which the tortious acts
or omissions occurred. 177 For statute of limitations purposes, however, the
United States is not treated like a private defendant, for it is well
established that the FTCA itself, not state law, prescribes the applicable
limitations periods for FTCA suits as well as the relevant rules for
limitations of actions.178 Thus, unlike private defendants, who may be
subject to varied state law limitations periods and different statute of
limitations rules, the United States is subject only to those time periods and
limitations rules specified in the FTCA. Congress’s decisions to modify
the Act’s limitations periods in 1949, 1966, and 1988, fully support this
distinguishing characteristic of the FTCA.
For this reason, the rules of Lane v. Pena179 and Library of Congress
v. Shaw180 are more analogous than Irwin to the equitable tolling problem
presented in the FTCA context. The statutes at issue in Lane and Shaw,
unlike the statute in Irwin, did not place the United States on the same
footing as private defendants with respect to the statutory provisions at
FTCA.”).
175
See, e.g., Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 696-97 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Crucial to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Irwin, that equitable tolling applies in suits under Title VII
against the United States, was the fact that ‘the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits
against private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.’” (quoting Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990))), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997).
176
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1982) (cited and
relied upon in Irwin).
177
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) (1993), 2674.
178
See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 13-14 & n.28 (1962); Bartleson v. United
States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1277 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 219
(5th Cir. 1996); Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991); Ulrich v.
Veterans Admin. Hosp., 853 F.2d 1078, 1080 (2d Cir. 1988); Zeleznik v. United States, 770
F.2d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Stoleson v. United States,
629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980); Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d
869, 871-74 (4th Cir. 1947). The only exception, of course, is found in the 1988 changes to
the Act’s statute of limitations, where Congress explicitly permitted state law limitations
periods to be used as a device for saving claims that would be time-barred under the
substitution procedure. See H.R. REP . NO . 100-700, supra note 158, at 7-8.
179
518 U.S. 187 (1996).
180
478 U.S. 310 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
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issue in those cases. The Lane and Shaw Courts thereby concluded that,
absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary, remedies available in
suits against private defendants were not available in suits against the
United States.181 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Shaw is particularly
illustrative because the statute at issue in that case, like the FTCA, rendered
the United States liable “the same as a private person.”182 However, the
Shaw Court did not put any weight on that fact largely because it begged
the question of whether Congress waived the United States’ immunity for
the remedy sought.183 Courts, therefore, should reject the suggestion that
general principles of tort law applicable to private parties, which are
disclaimed in other parts of the FTCA,184 require equitable tolling in FTCA
cases.
The unique role that Congress has played in determining the
applicable limitations periods in FTCA suits also renders unpersuasive
comparisons to other waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutesan analysis
undertaken by the Perez and Forman courts.185 The Supreme Court in
Irwin encouraged lower courts to eschew conclusions about equitable
tolling based on the linguistic nuances of statutes of limitations.186 Indeed,
the Beggerly Court did not compare the language of the relatively simple
statute of limitations in the Quiet Title Act with the relatively complex
181

See Lane, 518 U.S. at 196; Shaw, 478 U.S. at 316-19.
Shaw, 478 U.S. at 319; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1993) (stating that United
States held liable in tort in the same manner as a private party); § 2674 (same).
183
See Shaw, 478 U.S. at 319. In Shaw the Court stated:
Title VII’s provision making the United States liable ‘the same as a private
person’ waives the Government’s immunity from attorney’s fees, but not
interest. The statute, as well as its legislative history, contains no reference
to interest. This congressional silence does not permit us to read the
provision as the requisite waiver of the Government’s immunity with respect
to interest.
Id.
184
Indeed, unlike private tort defendants, the United States is not liable in a variety of
circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994) (retaining immunity against civil actions for
assault and battery, false imprisonment, false arres, libel or slander, and negligent or
intentional misrepresentations); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (punitive damages and
prejudgment interest); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (strict liability); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(discretionary acts rooted in policy); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994) (acts of independent
contractors). See also Neustadt v. United States, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (affirming immunity
for negligent or intentional misrepresentations); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972)
(affirming immunity against strict liability actions). See generally PROSSER & KEETON ,
supra note 173, § 131, at 1032-42 (detailing the differences between general tort law and the
FTCA).
185
See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999); Forman, 1999 WL
793429, at *9.
186
See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (“[W]e are not
persuaded that the difference between [the statutes of limitations] is enough to manifest a
different congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling.”).
182
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language of the tax statute in Brockamp. In Brockamp, the Court merely
held that the language of the tax statute’s limitations periods indicated a
congressional intent to foreclose equitable tolling, not that the language
itself, severed from other indicators of congressional intent, compelled the
conclusion that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply.
In this regard, Perez and Forman are mirror images of the preBrockamp and pre-Beggerly decisions that held that the tax-refund statute
and the Quiet Title Act were subject to equitable tolling. In Brockamp v.
United States,187 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that equitable tolling was
proper because “[t]he specific language of the statute does not speak to the
application of equitable tolling principles” and that “the legislative history
of [the tax-refund statute] ‘is absolutely devoid of any indication that
Congress intended to preclude such equitable tolling in tax refund
actions.’”188 In Fadem v. United States,189 a case the Supreme Court
remanded to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Brockamp, the
court held that the twelve-year limitations period in the Quiet Title Act
could be equitably tolled because, unlike the statute in Brockamp, the Quiet
Title Act’s statute of limitations “is non-technical, non-substantive and
comprised of two short sentences . . . .”190 Perez and Forman said
precisely the same thing about the FTCA.191 If the legislative history of the
tax-refund statute did not contain an explicit statement that equitable tolling
is impermissible (yet the Supreme Court found that equitable tolling was
impermissible nevertheless), and if the language of the Quiet Title Act was
187

67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
Id. at 262 (quoting Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 835-36 (E.D.N.Y.
1991)).
189
113 F.3d 167 (9th Cir. 1997).
190
Id. at 168.
191
See Perez, 167 F.3d at 917. The Perez court noted:
Perhaps these pieces of evidence are the best that can be collected from a
legislative record that does not directly address the issue, but they are
insufficient to overcome the presumption of Irwin that the government is
subject to equitable tolling . . . . By comparison, § 2401 makes just one
distinction, between the time period generally applicable and that applicable
if an agency issues a final denial of the claim.
Id.
Similarly, the Forman court stated:
Section 2401 is a garden variety limitations provision, without the attention
to detail in [the tax-refund statute] that suggested preemption of equitable
remedies . . . . In comparison, the Court [in Irwin] held that the limitations
period of Title VII was subject to equitable tolling in part due to the simple
language and to the separate treatment of limitations periods from the
treatment of substantive questions . . . . In Irwin, however, the Court
compared similar language to a less emphatic limitations provision and found
the particular choice of similar words not dispositive.
Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *9.
188
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not as complex as that of the tax refund statute (yet the Supreme Court
found that equitable tolling was impermissible anyway), then it stands to
reason that the same reasoning recycled in FTCA cases should also be
rejected.
Even so, comparing the FTCA to the statutes at issue in Beggerly and
Brockamp provides no definitive answers because the FTCA is both
different from, and similar to, both statutes. The FTCA’s statute of
limitations contains the same simple language as the Quiet Title Act, which
was at issue in Beggerly, and also has a built-in tolling provision like that
Act. In addition, the text of the FTCA contains equitable tolling,192 as did
the tax statute at issue in Brockamp, and, like the tax statute, contains a
legislative history replete with references to protecting the United States
against stale claims.193 On the other hand, the FTCA’s limitations periods
are relatively “short,” while Beggerly’s Quiet Title Act had a “long”
limitations period. The FTCA is unlike Brockamp’s tax statute because the
limitations provisions of the FTCA are not as complex as those in the tax
statute, and because there are fewer FTCA claims submitted than tax
claims. Therefore, one cannot draw any principled conclusion about
whether Congress intended to allow equitable tolling of the FTCA’s statute
of limitations by comparing the Act with other waiver statutes.
Moreover, the Perez and Forman courts’ use of the “linguistic
simplicity” method of analysis is flawed for another, more important
reason. According to those courts, the FTCA’s limitations periods may be
equitably tolled because the language of the Act’s statute of limitations is
“a garden variety limitations provision.”194 This conclusion, however,
cannot be squared with the Act’s legislative history. In 1966, the House
and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports made clear that Congress’s intent
was to “simplif[y]” the Act’s statute of limitations and to conform the
statute of limitations to the newly-added mandatory administrativeexhaustion requirement.195 Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that
192

See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5)(A)-(B) (1994).
See, e.g., H.R. REP . NO . 1532, supra note 25, at 6-7; S. REP . NO . 1327, supra note 25,
at 2-3; H.R. REP . NO . 276, supra note 24, at 4; S. REP . NO . 135, supra note 24, at 2-3; H.R.
REP . NO . 1754, supra note 24, at 4; H.R. REP . NO . 2428, supra note 108, at 5.
194
Perez, 167 F.3d at 917; see also Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (holding that sixmonth limitations period in FTCA is not complex or tied to jurisdiction of federal courts,
therefore equitable tolling of that period was permissible).
195
See H.R. REP . NO . 1532, supra note 25, at 5; S. REP . NO . 1327, supra note 25, at 8.
In particular, the House and Senate Reports stated the following:
This section amends the provisions of section 2401, the limitations section, to
conform the section to the amendments added by the bill. The amendments
have the effect of simplifying the language of section 2401 to require that a
claimant must file a claim in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
2 years after the claim accrues, and to further require the filing of a court
193
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equitable tolling applies to FTCA cases on the ground that the Act’s statute
of limitations is “simple,” when the reason for the simplicity has nothing to
do with whether equitable tolling is permissible. In addition to the 1966
legislative history, we question whether simplicity in a waiver-ofsovereign-immunity statute somehow allows a court to apply equitable
considerations and excuse a plaintiff from complying with the simple terms
of a statutory provision. For instance, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have declined to find any equitable exceptions to the FTCA’s mandatory
administrative-presentment requirement, finding the requirement “clear,”
easy to understand, and not terribly difficult to follow.196 Therefore,
neither as a matter of precedent nor logic can the “simplicity” rationale
support a finding that the FTCA’s limitations periods may be equitably
tolled.
Nor do we believe that the lengths of the FTCA’s limitations periods
have any bearing on the equitable tolling issue. The district court in
Forman held that the six-month limitations period could be equitably tolled
because, among other reasons, the time period is “short” as compared to the
Quiet Title Act.197 Putting to one side the arbitrariness of deciding what
period is “short” versus “long”to say nothing about the open-ended
invitation to judicial lawmaking such a rule would engendera
comparison to the length of the Quiet Title Act’s limitations period loses its
persuasive impact when we examine Congress’s intent with respect to the
FTCA. As we have said, both the one-year and six-month limitations
periods in the original Act were applauded for being “short” because they
protected the United States from having to defend stale claims.198 In 1966,
Assistant Attorney General Douglas indicated that the six-month period
represented an extension of the time within which an FTCA plaintiff could

action within 6 months of notice by certified or registered mail of a final
decision of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
Id. (emphasis added).
196
See M cNeil v. United States, 506 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1993) (“[G]iven the clarity of the
statutory text, it is certainly not a ‘trap for the unwary.’”); Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46,
54 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to apply equitable considerations to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)
(1994) where the statutory command is “clear”), on reh’g, 81 F.3d 520 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996); Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“‘The statutory procedure [outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)] is clear.’” (quoting Caton v.
United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974))); Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463
F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972) (“The language of § 2675(a) . . . is clear and unambiguous
and phrased in mandatory terms.”); Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219, 1220 (8th Cir.
1970) (same).
197
See Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (“The presumption favoring equitable tolling is
stronger where the limitations period is short.”).
198
See H.R. REP . NO . 2428, supra note 108, at 5; 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 108,
at 11 (statement of Frank Murphy, Attorney General of the United States).
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assert her rights against the United States.199 Therefore, assuming that the
length of the limitations period has anything to do with whether equitable
tolling is permissiblea very questionable assumption in our
view200 there are strong legislative indications that the six-month
limitations period was “short” for reasons other than opening the door to
equitable tolling.
The FTCA, then, provides a good example of how statutory
comparisons often cause courts to stray from an inquiry into the intent
behind the particular statute under review. As the methodology endorsed
by Beggerly and Brockamp makes abundantly clear, the focus should
always be on Congress’s intent with respect to the FTCA, and the FTCA
alone. That intent, which is demonstrated throughout the Act’s legislative
history, has been to lengthen the statutory periods themselves or to provide
equitable tolling only in specifically limited circumstances. It is irrelevant
that the limitations periods Congress has chosen are deemed by the
judiciary to be “short” or that the statutory language may be characterized
as simple.
Finally, a critic of the conclusions we reach here might mount an
attack on two fronts. First, the 1966 legislative history supports the view
that equitable tolling is permissible because Congress intended FTCA
plaintiffs to be treated more fairly and equitably when they sue the federal
government. Second, the purpose of encouraging the prompt presentation
of claims against the United States is not inconsistent with the doctrine of
equitable tolling because the doctrine is only invoked when a plaintiff has
been diligent and when the United States has already been put on notice of
the tort claim. 201 Although these arguments are certainly not without some
force, we ultimately reject them.
Congress has itself prescribed the proper balance of fairness to
claimants and fairness to the United States in defending tort claims. As the
legislative history reveals, Congress’s decision to change the statute of
limitations three times since the Act was passed in 1946 demonstrates the
199

See 1966 Hearings, supra note 139, at 18.
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 901 n.86 (arguing that judicial decision
characterizing a limitations period as “generous” or “not generous enough” for purposes of
equitable tolling analysis cannot be squared with canons of statutory construction in the
waiver-of-sovereign-immunity context).
201
See, e.g., Hyatt v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“In short,
the ‘obvious purpose’ of Section 2401(b), in encouraging prompt presentation of claims, is
still served if equitable tolling is applied in this case.”). We should point out, however, that
Hyatt is probably no longer good law in the Second Circuit. Hyatt’s premise was that Irwin
rendered the FTCA’s limitations periods non-jurisdictional and therefore subject to
equitable tolling. See id. at 100-01. The Second Circuit has since held that the FTCA’s
time limitations are jurisdictional. See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d
Cir. 1999).
200
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Congress’ concern that the balance struck in the statute of limitations
remains fair. This means that courts should not be allowed to upset this
balance in the equitable tolling context, just like courts are precluded from
doing so when other statute of limitations issues arise in FTCA cases. For
example, the United States is not permitted to benefit from more stringent
statute of limitations rules prescribed in certain states,202 and FTCA
plaintiffs are precluded from benefiting from more favorable state-law
limitations rules.203 Courts do not permit the United States or plaintiffs to
sidestep the FTCA’s statute of limitations out of respect for the balance that
Congress has struck in fashioning the time limitations applicable to FTCA
suits.204 We propose that courts pay the same respect in the equitable
tolling context.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the FTCA’s limitations periods could be
equitably tolled after Beggerly and Brockamp has been, and will continue
to be, litigated. The ultimate answer to the equitable tolling problem must
come from the Supreme Court, which, in recent years, has shown an
interest in more precisely defining the reach of Irwin. It appears that it is
only a matter of time before the Court will be faced with a case that
squarely presents the issue of whether the FTCA is subject to equitable
tolling. In this regard, there already exists an inter-Circuit split on the issue
of whether the Act’s limitations periods are jurisdictional,205 and there are
202

See, e.g., Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
government’s argument that state-law rule of accrual applied to FTCA claim because rule of
accrual specified in FTCA applied); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 223-24 (5th Cir.
1996) (rejecting government argument that wrongful death claim accrued pre-death because
doing so would deprive FTCA claimants of the two-year period prescribed by Congress).
203
See, e.g., Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274-75 (10th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting FTCA plaintiff’s argument that state tolling statute applied to FTCA claim
because doing so would upset balance struck by Congress).
204
See, e.g., Johnston, 85 F.3d at 220, 223-24 (declining to adopt state law in limitations
analysis where to do so would upset congressional balance struck in FTCA’s statute of
limitations); Pipkin, 951 F.2d at 275 (rejecting argument that state-law tolling provision
would apply to toll six-month period because “[c]ourts are not free to construe section
2401(b) so as to defeat that section’s purpose of encouraging prompt presentation of claims
against the federal government”).
205
See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
FTCA’s limitations periods are jurisdictional); Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159
(5th Cir. 1998) (same); Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997) (same);
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Goodhand v. United
States, 40 F.3d 209, 214 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779
(1st Cir. 1992) (same); Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).
But see Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
FTCA’s limitations periods are not jurisdictional); Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527,
530-31 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Glarner v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d
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at least three intra-Circuit splits on that precise question. 206 Although, as
we argued in our 1999 paper, the jurisdiction and equitable tolling issues
are analytically distinct,207 courts nonetheless often combine the two in
their discussion of the FTCA’s statute of limitations. Therefore, by
deciding the jurisdictional issue together with the equitable tolling
questionwhich is a virtual certainty in cases where compliance with the
Act’s statute of limitations is raised as a bar to suitthe Supreme Court or
courts of appeals will have a number of opportunities to provide lower
courts and litigants with additional guidance on how to resolve these
important issues.
We have weighed in on these questions twice. And we have done so
not out of some desire to get in the first word or to provide the United
States a litigation weapon. Rather, we have tried to provide courts with a
complete picture of the FTCA’s statute of limitations and its legislative
history, a history that is not readily accessible to courts, so that a decision
on equitable tolling will be fully informed. In charting what we believe to
be the proper course, we have fielded the Beggerly-Brockamp pitch and
pulled together evidence from the text, purposes, and legislative history of
the FTCA that sheds light on the question of whether equitable tolling is
consistent with congressional intent.
Unfortunately, after Beggerly and Brockamp, courts are not likely to

697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Krueger v. Saiki, 19 F.3d 1285, 1286 (8th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 905 (1994).
206
In the Fifth Circuit compare Perez, 167 F.3d at 915-16 (holding that the two-year
limitations period is not jurisdictional) with Flory, 138 F.3d at 159 (holding that the FTCA’s
two-year limitations period is jurisdictional) and Johnston, 85 F.3d at 218 n.2 (same) and
M acMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d 377, 380 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).
In the Sixth Circuit compare Miller v. United States Postal Serv., 995 F.2d 1067, 1993
WL 64144, at *1 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the FTCA’s
limitations periods are jurisdictional), Willis v. United States, 972 F.2d 350, 1992 WL
180181, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (same), Horten v. United States,
961 F.2d 1577, 1992 WL 102719, at *1 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision)
(affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff did not comply
with FTCA’s two-year limitations period), with Glarner, 30 F.3d at 701 (holding that
FTCA’s limitations periods are not jurisdictional).
In the Seventh Circuit compare Kanar, 118 F.3d at 530-31 (opinion by Easterbrook, J.)
(holding that the Act’s limitations periods are not jurisdictional), with Goodhand, 40 F.3d at
214 (opinion by Posner, C.J.) (holding that the limitations periods in the FTCA are
jurisdictional), and State Farm Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 2d 985, 987 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (same), and Burns v. United States Dept. of Justice, 864 F. Supp. 80, 81 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (same), and Willis v. United States, 879 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 65 F.3d
171 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (Posner, C.J. & Easterbrook, J. on panel)
(“We express no opinion on whether Irwin transformed the statute of limitations from a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an affirmative defense . . . .”).
207
See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 898, 902-04 (reasoning that limitations periods
can be jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling).
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find a clear statement from Congress that “equitable tolling is
impermissible” or that “there shall be no equitable tolling.” Indeed, there
were no such statements in the history accompanying the statutes in
Beggerly and Brockamp. Such a statement from Congress would surely
provide the simplest, most certain, and most legitimate answer to the
Beggerly-Brockamp question; however, this is not the case in the FTCA
context. For the textualist, the process of answering the equitable tolling
question is sure to be an uncomfortable one. Irwin uses a judicially-crafted
presumptiona dice-loading rule in Justice Scalia’s eyes208 to speak for
Congress in all waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes. Perhaps it is time
for the Court to reconsider the rebuttable -presumption rule altogether,209 or
to limit the rule to waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes (like Title VII)
that treat private parties and the United States the same for statute of
limitations purposes.210 If the Court decides to limit Irwin in this way, such
a decision would certainly shrink the ranks of “hapless law clerk[s],” 211 and
hapless trial attorneys for that matter, who must present legislative history
as evidence that the presumption favoring equitable tolling has been
rebutted.
With that said, we have concluded that when Congress originally
considered the limitations periods that should apply to tort claims brought
against the United States, a number of prior bills contained equitable tolling
provisions, but those provisions never made it into the Act as passed.
Claimants were left, therefore, with a private bill of relief in inequitable
circumstances. Moreover, each time Congress amended the FTCA’s
statute of limitations (in 1949, 1966, and again in 1988), equitable tolling
was on the legislative table, and each time Congress either chose not to
incorporate it into the Act, or did so by specifying the circumstances in
208

See SCALIA, supra note 51, at 28.
See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 675-81 (1999) (overruling prior case that permitted constructive waiver of
State’s sovereign immunity because implied waivers of sovereign immunity are invalid).
210
Compare Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1363-68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that Irwin’s rebuttable-presumption rule applies to time limit for appealing decision of
Board of Veterans’ Appeals), with id. at 1369-70 (Michel, J., concurring) (holding that Irwin
is “narrow” and interpreting Irwin as allowing equitable tolling only because equitable
tolling was permitted in private Title VII suits), and id. at 1371 (Bryson, J., joined by
Lourie, Rader & Schall, JJ., dissenting) (reasoning that Irwin did not control because “[t]he
statutory procedure in [Title VII] cases involving government employees is essentially the
same as the procedure in cases involving private employees, and the Court had previously
held in private sector cases that the statutory time limits in Title VII are nonjurisdictional
and thus subject to equitable tolling”).
211
See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I confess
that I have not personally investigated the entire legislative history or even that portion of
it which relates to the four statutes listed above. The excerpts I have examined and quoted
were unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task.”).
209
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which the time periods would be extended. At the same time, Congress has
repeatedly expressed its intent to facilitate the prompt presentation of tort
claims against the United States. Thus, because Congress has historically
assumed the role of modifying the FTCA’s limitations periods to cure
inequities in its application, and because Congress has consistently
highlighted the importance of timely compliance with the Act’s limitations
periods, there is very good reason to believe that Congress did not want
judicially crafted rules of equitable tolling to extend the FTCA’s limitations
periods. There is more than sufficient evidence in the legislative history to
overcome any presumption that equitable tolling should apply to the
FTCA’s limitations periods. To ignore this legislative history or to
discount its significance transforms Irwin’s rebuttable presumption into a
conclusive presumption.
Finally, our conclusion is fully consistent with a broader view of the
historical relationship between Congress and Article III courts when it
comes to tort compensation. The Act does not, and never did, replace the
private-bill mechanism. Since the passage of the FTCA, there are
numerous examples of Congress entertaining private bills of relief when
tort compensation could not be obtained in an Article III court.212 This
212
See, e.g., H.R. 998, 105th Cong. (1997) (private bill of relief for Lloyd B. Gamble,
whose tort claim would have been barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations); H.R. 1009,
104th Cong. (1996) (same); H.R. 4862, 103d Cong. (1994) (private bill of relief for
INSLAW, Inc., William A. Hamilton, and Nancy Hamilton, which would confer jurisdiction
on the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate the claim and waive jurisdictional defenses,
such as statute of limitations); H.R. 3344, 103d Cong. (1994) (private bill of relief for Lloyd
B. Gamble, whose tort claim would have been barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations);
H.R. 808, 103d Cong. (1993) (private bill of relief for James B. Stanley, whose tort claim
was barred under the Feres doctrine in the case of United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987)); H.R. 572, 103d Cong. (1993) (private bill of relief for Melissa Johnson, whose tort
claim was barred by the assault and battery exception of the FTCA); H.R. 5164, 102d Cong.
(1992) (private bill of relief for Craig B. Sorensen and Nita M. Sorensen, whose tort claims
would have barred under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations); H.R. 455, 102d Cong.
(1992) (private bill of relief for Melissa Johnson, whose tort claim was barred by the assault
and battery exception of the FTCA); H.R. 2345, 102d Cong. (1992) (private bill of relief for
William A. Kubrick, whose tort claim was held time-barred under the two-year limitations
period in the case of United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)); H.R. 1759, 102d Cong.
(1992) (private bill of relief for James B. Stanley, whose tort claim was barred under the
Feres doctrine in the case of United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)); H.R. 760, 102d
Cong. (1992) (private bill of relief for Willie D. Harris, whose tort claim would have been
barred by the Feres doctrine and the FTCA’s statute of limitations, that would have
permitted claimant to sue in federal court); H.R. 238, 102d Cong. (1991) (private bill of
relief for Craig A. Klein, whose tort claim would have been barred by the customs exception
in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)); H.R. 2937, 101st Cong. (1990) (private bill of relief for Rodney E.
Hoover, whose claim would have been time-barred, that would have permitted Hoover to
proceed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California); H.R. 4356,
101st Cong. (1990) (private bill of relief for John Barren, whose tort claim was adjudicated
to be time-barred under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations in Barren ex rel. Barren
v. United States, 839 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988)); H.R. 308, 101st
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relationship between two co-equal branches of the federal government
explains why the United States is unlike any other private tort defendant
when it comes to equitable tolling. Congress has enacted a limited waiver
of sovereign immunity in tort, reserving for itself the responsibility of
compensating those whose claims do not come within the strict waiver of
immunity. That necessarily includes those who do not comply with the
Act’s limitations periods.

Cong. (1990) (private bill of relief for Banfi Products Corp., whose tort claim was barred by
the discretionary function exception, that would permit the Court of Claims to adjudicate the
claim); S. 1077, 84th Cong. (1955) (private bill of relief to compensate victims of the Texas
City Disaster, whose tort claims were barred by the discretionary function exception in
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)).
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APPENDIX
THE LIMITATIONS AND EQUITABLE TOLLING P ROVISIONS OF LEGISLATIVE
P ROPOSALS CONSIDERED P RIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

BILL NUMBER

LIMITATIONS PERIODS

H.R. 12178, 68th
Cong. (Feb. 5, 1925)

(1) One year for personal injury or
death claims (§ 6)

EQUITABLE
T OLLING
None

(2) No waiver of immunity for
property damage claims

H.R. 12179, 68th
Cong. (Feb. 5, 1925)

(1) Two years for personal injury
and death claims

None

(2) No waiver of immunity for
property damage claims

H.R. 6716, 69th Cong.
(Jan. 5, 1926)

(1) Six months for property
damage
(§ 2(c))
(2) Thirty days for personal injury
(§ 202(c))
(3) Six months for wrongful death
(§ 202(c))

(1) Time to file
personal injury claims
extended
by
six
months if reasonable
cause shown
(§ 202(c))
(2) Period for minors
under eighteen and
incompetent
does
not begin to run until
guardian or trustee
obtained (§ 305)
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H.R. 8914, 69th Cong.
(Feb. 4, 1926)

(1) Two years for personal injury
or death claims (§ 5)

221

None

(2) No waiver of immunity for
property damage claims

S. 1912, 69th Cong.
(Mar. 26, 1926)

(1) Six months for property
damage claims accruing prior to
Act (§ 5)
(2) Six years for property damage
(§ 5)
(3) Sixty days for personal injury
(§ 202(a))
(4) Six months for wrongful death
(§ 202(a))

H.R. 9285, 70th Cong.
(Jan. 13, 1928)

(1) One year for property damage
claims accruing prior to Act (§ 5)
(2) Six years for property damage
(§ 5)
(3) Six months for personal injury
(§ 202(a))
(4) One year for wrongful death
(§ 202(a))

S. 4377, 71st Cong.
(May 7, 1930)

(1) Ninety days for property
damage
(§ 1(d))
(2) Ninety days for personal
injury and wrongful death claims
(§ 202(a))

(1) Time to file
personal injury claims
extended
by
six
months if reasonable
cause shown
(§ 202(a))
(2) Period for minors
under eighteen and
incompetents does not
begin to run until
guardian or trustee
obtained (§ 304)

(1) Time to file
personal injury claims
extended by one year
if reasonable cause
shown (§ 202(a))
(2) Period for minors
under
twenty-one,
idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons at
sea extended one year
from time disability
ceases (§ 304)

(1) Time to file
personal injury claims
extended by one year
if reasonable cause
shown (§ 202(a))
(2) Period for minors
under
twenty-one,
idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons at
sea extended one year
from time disability
ceases (§ 304)
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(1) Ninety days for property
damage
(§ 1(d))
(2) Ninety days for personal
injury and wrongful death claims
(§ 202(a))

H.R. 16429, 71st
Cong. (Jan. 21, 1931)

(1) Ninety days for property
damage (§ 2)
(2) Ninety days for personal
injury
(§ 23(a)(1))

H.R. 17168, 71st
Cong. (Feb. 18, 1931)

(1) Ninety days to file with
agency for property damage claim
under $1,000 (§ 2)
(2) Ninety days for property
damage claim over $1,000 filed in
court (§ 2)
(3) Ninety days to file in court
after agency decision (§ 2)
(4) One year to file with agency
for personal injury or death claims
under $1,000 (§ 202)
(5) One year for personal injury or
death claims over $1,000 (§ 202)
(6) Ninety days to file in court
after agency decision (§ 202)
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(1) Time to file
personal injury claims
extended by one year
if reasonable cause
shown (§ 202(a))
(2) Period for minors
under
twenty-one,
idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons at
sea extended one year
from time disability
ceases (§ 304)

Period for minors
under
twenty-one,
idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons at
sea extended one year
from time disability
ceases (§ 304)

None
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S. 211, 72d Cong.
(Dec. 9, 1931)

(1) Thirty days to file property
damage claim with agency
(§ 2(d))

223

None

(2) Thirty days to file personal
injury and death claims with
agency (§ 202(a))
(3) One year to file suit after
agency decision (§ 303(2))

H.R. 5065, 72d Cong.
(Dec. 9, 1931)

(1) Thirty days to file property
damage claim with agency
(§ 1(d))

None

(2) Thirty days to file personal
injury or death claim with agency
(§ 202(a))
(3) One year to file suit after
agency decision (§ 303(2))

S. 4567, 72d Cong.
(May 4, 1932)

(1) Thirty days to file property
damage claim with agency
(§ 2(c))
(2) Thirty days to file personal
injury or death claim with agency
(§ 202(a))
(3) One year to file suit after
agency decision (§ 304(2))

(1) Notice of property
damage claim timely if
filed with agency
within ninety days and
reasonable cause and
no prejudice to the
United States shown
(§ 2(c))
(2) Notice of personal
injury or death claim
timely if filed with
agency within ninety
days and reasonable
cause and no prejudice
to the United States
shown (§ 202(a))
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(1) Two years to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 2(e))
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None

(2) Two years to file all claims
over $1,000 in Court of Claims
(§ 2(e)(1))
(3) Ninety days from agency
denial, or, if 1 year passes without
agency decision, 90 days after
expiration of 1 year (§ 2(e)(2))

S. 1833, 73d Cong.
(May 29, 1933)

(1) Thirty days to file property
damage claim with agency
(§ 1(b), (c))
(2) Thirty days to file personal
injury or death claim with agency
(§ 202(a), (b))
(3) If no agency action within 6
months, suit may be filed
(§ 304(1))
(4) One year to file suit after
agency denial (§ 304(2))

(1) Notice of property
damage claim timely if
filed with agency
within ninety days and
reasonable cause and
no prejudice to the
United States shown
(§ 1(c))
(2) Notice of personal
injury or death claims
timely if filed with
agency within ninety
days and reasonable
cause and no prejudice
to the United States
shown (§ 202(a))

H.R. 8561, 73d Cong.
(Mar. 9, 1934)

Three years for all tort claims
(§ 10)

None

H.R. 2028, 74th Cong.
(Jan. 3, 1935)

(1) Two years to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 2(e))

None

(2) Two years to file all claims
over $1,000 in Court of Claims
(§ 2(e)(1))
(3) Ninety days from agency
denial, or, if 1 year passes without
agency decision, 90 days after
expiration of 1 year (§ 2(e)(2))
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S. 1043, 74th Cong.
(Jan. 14, 1935)

(1) Thirty days to file property
damage claim with agency
(§ 1(b), (c))
(2) Thirty days to file personal
injury or death claim with agency
(§ 202(a), (b))
(3) If no agency action within 6
months, suit may be filed
(§ 304(1))
(4) One year to file suit after
agency denial (§ 304(2))

H.R. 7236, 76th Cong.
(July 14, 1939)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301)

(1) Notice of property
damage claim timely if
filed with agency
within ninety days and
reasonable cause and
no prejudice to the
United States shown
(§ 1(c))
(2) Notice of personal
injury or death claims
timely if filed with
agency within ninety
days and reasonable
cause and no prejudice
to the United States
shown (§ 202(a))

None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 301)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 301)

S. 2690, 76th Cong.
(June 24, 1939)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301)

None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 301)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 301)

H.R. 5185, 77th Cong.
(June 26, 1941)

One year to file all claims under
$1,000 with agency
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None
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(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301)
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None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 301)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 301)

S. 1743, 77th Cong.
(July 14, 1941)

(1) One year to file personal
injury and property damage
claims with agency

None

(2) No provision for death claims

H.R. 5373, 77th Cong.
(July 21, 1941)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301)

None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 301)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 301)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency
(§ 301)

S. 2207, 77th Cong.
(Jan. 16, 1942)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401)
(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 401)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 401)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency
(§ 401)

None
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S. 2221, 77th Cong.
(Jan. 23, 1942)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401)

None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 401)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 401)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency (§
401)

H.R. 6463, 77th Cong.
(Jan. 26, 1942)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401)

None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 401)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 401)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency
(§ 401)

H.R. 817, 78th Cong.
(Jan. 7, 1943)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301)

None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 301)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 301)

H.R. 1356, 78th Cong.
(Jan. 20, 1943)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401)
(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 401)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 401)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency
(§ 401)

None
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(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401)
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None

(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 401)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 401)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency
(§ 401)

H.R. 181, 79th Cong.
(Jan. 3, 1945)

(1) One year to file all claims
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401)
(2) One year to file suit for all
claims over $1,000 (§ 401)
(3) Six months to file suit after
agency denial (§ 401)
(4) Six months to file suit after
claim withdrawn from agency
(§ 401)

None

